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CHARLES ELMORE LLOYD

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1948.

No. 548

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN,
Petitioner,

vs.


THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD
COMPANY, ET AL.,
Respondents.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION.**

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INDEX.

PAGE

Petition:

Statement of the Matter Involved	2
Statement as to Jurisdiction	6
Questions Presented	7
Reasons for Allowance of Writ	9

Brief:

Opinions of Courts Below	13
Jurisdiction	13
Statement of the Case	14
Specification of Errors	14
Summary of Argument	17
Argument	20
I. The Court of Appeals Has Misconstrued This Court's Decision in the Instant Case as Holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act Is Inapplicable	20
II. The Court of Appeals Has Erroneously Interpreted the Interstate Commerce Act as Providing an Exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act	23
III. The Court of Appeals Has Erroneously Construed Rule 65(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to Mean that Employees of a Party Cannot Be Indispensable Parties	25
IV. Reconsideration of a Preliminary Injunction on Motion to Dissolve Made by a Subsequent Intervenor of Right Who Brings in New Issues Requires the Court to Make New Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Under Rule 52(a)	27

V. Questions Fundamental to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction Must be Passed on by the Reviewing Court When Presented to It	30
VI. The Court of Appeals Should Not Have Sanctioned the District Court's Refusal to Require an Adequate Bond to Protect Enjoined Employees	33
Conclusion	35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.

Cases.

Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 170 F. 2d 654	13
Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies' G. W. Union, 55 F. Supp. 572, affirmed in 147 F. 2d 246, certiorari denied 325 U. S. 852	34, 35
East Texas Motor Fr. L. v. International Brotherhd., etc., 163 F. 2d 10 (5th Circuit 1947)	9, 24
Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 21 F. Supp. 282	31
Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649	32
International L. G. W. Union v. Donnelly G. Co., 304 U. S. 243	22
Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731	6, 14
Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F. 2d 931 (10th Circuit 1942), certiorari denied 317 U. S. 645	9, 24
Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Can Co., 309 U. S. 310 ..	30
Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 331 U. S. 519	2, 9, 20, 25
Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399	6, 14
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373	6, 14, 32
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219	25
United States v. Weirton Steel Co., 7 F. Supp. 255 ...	32

*Rules.***Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts of the
United States:**

Rule 52(a)	7, 10, 15, 18, 19, 27, 30
Rule 65(e)	34
Rule 65(d)	9, 10, 18, 25, 26, 27
Rule 65(e)	10, 26

*Statutes.***Interstate Commerce Act:**

Section 5 (2) (f) of Part I (49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 5 (2) (f))	8, 10, 15, 28, 31
Section 16 (12) of Part I (49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 16 (12))	7, 9, 15

Judicial Code and Judiciary:

Section 1254 (28 U. S. C. Sec. 1254)	6, 14
Section 2101 (28 U. S. C. Sec. 2101)	6, 14

Norris-LaGuadia Act:

Sections 1-15 (29 U. S. C. A. Secs. 101-115) ..	7, 14, 15
Section 7(e) (29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 107(e))	34

Text.

43 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 19, pages 432 and 433	32
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**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT.**

*To the Honorable Fred A. Vinson, Chief Justice of the
United States, and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States:*

Petitioner, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, an unincorporated association, intervening defendant and appellant below, herewith petitions for review on writ of certiorari of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit made November 11, 1948 affirming an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

STATEMENT OF THE MATTER INVOLVED.

This is a suit for an injunction and damages based on an alleged violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission order. This petition is concerned with a preliminary injunction against the defendant railroads and their employees, issued when the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, petitioner herein, was not a party. Intervention of the Brotherhood, as of right, was allowed pursuant to mandate of this Court in *Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 331 U. S. 519. Immediately after its intervention the Brotherhood moved to dissolve the injunction, and on denial of this motion appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed. A brief history of the case follows.

Since 1922 The Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Company, herein called the River Road, has operated a switching railroad connecting the Union Stock Yards at Chicago with all of the trunk lines which haul livestock to and from Chicago (R. 3, 13-16). The switching and spotting of stock cars on River Road tracks has been handled in some instances by River Road power and crews and in others by the power and crews of the trunk lines (R. 4, 52-53, 149-157, 190-191, 217). The River Road employees have long contended that under their bargaining agreements they should handle all this work on River Road tracks (R. 110, 112, 120, 144, 188-189).

On January 23, 1946, in order to settle this dispute and other disputes then pending with its yard service employees, the River Road agreed to assign its own employees to do the switching and spotting work on River Road tracks for all *outbound* livestock movements (R. 145, 85). The

agreement provided that foreign line crews would be allowed to handle the *inbound* movements on River Road tracks (R. 85).

The trunk lines were notified of this agreement (R. 6-7), and it thereafter took effect on February 1, 1946 (R. 85), whereupon River Road power and crews began handling the switching and spotting of stock cars on River Road tracks for all outbound movements (R. 149-150). This method effected a change only in the case of outbound shipments of beef cattle, because River Road power and crews had previously handled these movements in the case of other livestock, such as hogs, sheep, horses and show livestock (R. 152-157).

On February 12, 1946 seven of the trunk lines brought this suit (R. 2) for an injunction and damages (R. 11-12), alleging that the above method of handling outbound shipments of livestock, other than hogs and sheep, was violative of Condition 3 in an Interstate Commerce Commission order of May 16, 1922 (R. 5, 8), and praying that an injunction issue against the River Road and its employees to permit plaintiff railroads to handle the disputed movements with their own power and crews on River Road tracks (R. 11-12). The Interstate Commerce Commission, herein called the Commission, intervened as a plaintiff (R. 47) and joined in the prayer for an injunction against alleged violation of Condition 3 of the 1922 Commission Order (R. 49), which is as follows:

"3. The present traffic and operating relationships existing between the Junction and the River Road and all carriers operating in Chicago shall be continued, in so far as such matters are within the control of the Central" (R. 5).

Neither the River Road employees, who were sought to be enjoined, nor their collective bargaining representatives were named by plaintiffs as parties, *i. e.*, the train-

men (Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen), the engineers (Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers), or the firemen and enginemen (Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen) (R. 2-3, 143-144). The only defendants named were the River Road, The New York Central Railroad Company (herein called the Central) which owns the River Road's capital stock (R. 5), and the Chicago Junction Railway Company (herein called the Junction) which is the lessor of some of the River Road tracks (R. 2-3).

The parties then in the suit entered into a stipulation of facts (R. 51-59) on the basis of which a preliminary injunction as prayed for was granted on March 14, 1946 (R. 59-68). Three days after the injunction against River Road employees went into effect, the trainmen, acting through the Brotherhood, attempted to appear specially to invite the District Court's attention to the absence of River Road employees as indispensable parties (R. 70-71). This was refused (R. 76), and the Brotherhood then sought general intervention of right (R. 94-128), which was also refused (R. 134), but the order denying intervention was reversed on appeal to this Court (R. 287), and the Brotherhood finally was allowed to intervene of right as a defendant on September 26, 1947 (R. 138). The River Road engineers and the firemen and enginemen are still not parties.

Immediately after its intervention the Brotherhood moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction, urging the absence of indispensable parties, non-compliance with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that the working agreement, performance of which had been enjoined, was specifically authorized by the Interstate Commerce Act and was not violative of the Commission order sued on (R. 139-142). The Brotherhood filed affidavits in support of this motion (R. 142-157, 188-198), and plaintiff railroads filed counter-affidavits (R. 162-187, 198-222). Pending action on this mo-

tion to vacate the injunction, the Brotherhood also moved for an injunction bond to protect River Road employees (R. 158-160). The District Court denied these motions, except that plaintiff railroads were required to file a bond, limited so as to cover only those losses of trainmen incurred after the Brotherhood's motion for bond had reached the Judge's calendar (R. 260-261, 231). The Brotherhood appealed (R. 261-262), and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed (R. 285-294).

The Court of Appeals held that in the earlier appeal this Court had determined the Norris-LaGuardia Act to be inapplicable (R. 290-291); that this statute has no application to suits brought under the Interstate Commerce Act (R. 289-290); that Rule 65(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure precludes the suggestion that employees of a party can be indispensable parties in an injunction suit (R. 292); and that Rule 52 (a) requires no findings or conclusions as to defenses raised by the Brotherhood (R. 292-293). The Court of Appeals declined to pass on the other defenses, holding that they could be raised only against plaintiffs' application for a permanent injunction (R. 293).

STATEMENT AS TO JURISDICTION.

Judgment Sought to Be Reviewed.

On November 11, 1948, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered judgment affirming the order entered February 26, 1948 by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denying the motion of the Brotherhood to vacate the preliminary injunction entered March 14, 1946. Application for writ of certiorari is made February 5, 1949. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1948, has been made part of the printed record herein (R. 285-293). The District Court rendered no opinion.

Statutory Provisions and Cases Sustaining Jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction, by writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party, to review a judgment rendered in a United States Court of Appeals. 28 U. S. C. Sec. 1254. The application may be made within 90 days after entry of such judgment. 28 U. S. C. Sec. 2101.

This Court's jurisdiction to grant certiorari extends to a judgment sustaining a preliminary injunction. *Land v. Dollar*, 330 U. S. 731, 735; *United States v. General Motors Corp.*, 323 U. S. 373, 377; *Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co.*, 261 U. S. 399, 418.

Substantial Questions Involved.

The questions involved on this appeal are substantial, as appears from the statement of them immediately following.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

The questions presented herein include:

(a) Whether in a case in which intervention is sought for the purpose of urging the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U. S. C. A. Secs. 101-115) as a defense to injunctive relief, a decision on appeal reversing an order denying intervention necessarily constitutes a determination as to the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, even though the decision on appeal does not mention the Act.

(b) Whether Section 16(12) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 16(12)), providing that federal courts may issue injunctions to enforce orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, authorizes the issuance of injunctions in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes notwithstanding the restrictions imposed on the granting of such relief by the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U. S. C. A. Secs. 101-115).

(c) Whether in a suit to enjoin the performance of collectively bargained contracts between a railroad carrier and its employees, brought by a third party on the theory that performance of such contracts is violative of an Interstate Commerce Commission order, such employees or their representatives are indispensable parties.

(d) Whether Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the court which grants a preliminary injunction to state findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action, applies to action taken on a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction made by a party who intervened of right after issuance of the injunction bringing in new facts and raising questions of law which were not passed on at the original issuance of the injunction, which injunction was based on a stipulation of facts not joined in by the intervenor of right.

(e) Whether Section 5(2)(f) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 5(2)(f)), authorizing collective bargaining agreements for the protection of employees of a railroad carrier whose properties are taken over by another carrier, provides a defense to an action brought to enjoin performance of such agreements on the ground that they are violative of an Interstate Commerce Commission order, and whether this question of statutory interpretation may properly be raised in opposition to a preliminary injunction.

(f) Whether a condition in an Interstate Commerce Commission order requiring a carrier to continue "traffic and operating relationships" with foreign lines can or should be construed to prohibit an agreement between the carrier and its employees providing that such employees may handle car movements on its tracks which were previously handled by foreign crews, and whether this question of the proper interpretation of a Commission order may properly be raised in opposition to a preliminary injunction.

(g) Whether it is in the public interest to enjoin performance of a collectively bargained contract between a carrier and its employees covering car movements on the carrier's own tracks on the ground that an Interstate Commerce Commission order requires that such movements be handled by foreign crews, and whether this question of public interest may properly be raised in opposition to a preliminary injunction.

(h) Whether a preliminary injunction bond may properly be conditioned so as to limit its protection among the persons enjoined to those who have intervened as parties and as to intervenors only for damages sustained after they have been allowed to intervene and their motion for a bond has reached the calendar of the trial judge.

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT.

There are special and important reasons for review on writ of certiorari herein, as follows:

(a) The Court of Appeals has held that this Court, by its decision in this same case reversing the order of the District Court denying intervention to the Brotherhood, also decided that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is inapplicable and thus is not available as a defense to the injunctive relief sought. The applicability of the Act was not passed on by this Court, nor was the Act mentioned in this Court's opinion (*Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 331 U. S. 519). The scope of this Court's decision in the instant case thereby has been seriously misconstrued and misapplied.

(b) The Court of Appeals has held that Section 16(12) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, in authorizing injunctions to enforce orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, provides an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, so that an injunction may be issued under the former statute irrespective of whether the case involves or grows out of a labor dispute and whether the requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act have been met. This holding is in conflict with the decisions of this Court, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the same matter, as follows:

Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F. 2d 931 (10th Circuit 1942), certiorari denied in 317 U. S. 645.

East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. International Brotherhood, 163 F. 2d 10 (5th Circuit 1947).

(c) The Court of Appeals has held that Rule 65(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that an

injunction is binding on the employees of a party to the action, precludes the suggestion that such employees are indispensable parties, although the suit is brought to enjoin performance of collectively bargained contracts wherein the employer and its employees have admittedly adverse interests. This holding seriously misconstrues Rule 65(d) so as to make it provide an exception to the established principles governing indispensable parties, and is in conflict with Rule 65(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that Rule 65(d) does not modify the laws relating to preliminary injunctions in actions affecting employer and employee.

(d) The Court of Appeals has held that Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires no findings of fact or conclusions of law constituting the grounds for the District Court's action in denying a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction, although the motion was made by an intervenor of right who was not a party when the injunction was issued, and whose motion was supported by new facts and who urged defenses not theretofore passed on by the court, and although the preliminary injunction was based on a stipulation of facts not joined in by the intervenor of right. This holding raises an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

(e) The Court of Appeals has held that the applicability of Section 5(2)(f) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, which by its terms purports to authorize the labor contract enjoined herein, is a question which cannot properly be raised as a defense to the preliminary injunction, but should be reserved to a trial on the merits, although the facts relative to this matter are not in dispute and the question is purely one of statutory construction. In this the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

(f) The Court of Appeals has held that in this suit to enjoin alleged violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission order, an interpretation of the order in question as applied to the acts sought to be enjoined is an issue which cannot properly be raised in opposition to the preliminary injunction, but should be reserved to a trial on the merits. In this the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

(g) The Court of Appeals has held that the question whether it is against the public interest to enjoin performance of a collective bargaining agreement between a carrier and its employees may not properly be raised in opposition to a preliminary injunction, but should be reserved to a trial on the merits. In this the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

(h) The Court of Appeals has sanctioned the action of the District Court in refusing to require any preliminary injunction bond to protect the enjoined employees for the period during which they were denied intervention of right even though such denial was held on appeal to be erroneous and motion for such a bond was made promptly after intervention was allowed. These employees thereby have been penalized by the District Court for its own error in denying them intervention, and this constitutes a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings which calls for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue under the seal of this Court, directed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, commanding said Court to certify and send to this Court a full and complete

transcript of the record and of the proceedings of the said Court of Appeals had in the case numbered and entitled on its docket No. 9615, The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, *et al.*, plaintiffs-appellees, *vs.* The Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Company, *et al.*, defendants-appellees, Interstate Commerce Commission, intervening plaintiff-appellee, and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, intervening defendant-appellant, to the end that this cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court as provided for by the statutes of the United States; and that the judgment herein of said Court of Appeals be reversed by this Court; and for such further relief as to this Court may seem proper.

February 5, 1949.

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN,
Petitioner.

By

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**BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI.**

Opinions of Courts Below.

The District Court did not render an opinion.

The opinion in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (R. 285-293) is reported in 170 F. 2d 654 (Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co.).

Jurisdiction.

1. The date of the judgment sought to be reviewed is November 11, 1948.

2. The statutory provisions which are believed to sustain the jurisdiction of this Court are 28 U. S. C. sections 1254 and 2101.

3. As set forth in the above cited statutory provisions, the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction, by writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party, to review a judgment rendered in a United States Court of Appeals. The application for certiorari may be made within ninety days after entry of such judgment. This Court's jurisdiction to grant certiorari extends to a judgment sustaining a preliminary injunction.

4. The cases believed to sustain this jurisdiction are as follows:

Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 735.

United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377.

Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399, 418.

Statement of the Case.

A statement of the case already has been made in the preceding Petition (pp. 2-5), which hereby is adopted and made a part of this brief.

Specification of Errors.

If the petition is granted, the petitioner will urge that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in the following respects:

1. In holding that when the petitioner sought to intervene in this case for the purpose of urging the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U. S. C. A. Secs. 101-115) as a defense to injunctive relief, the decision of the United States Supreme Court on appeal reversing the order of the

District Court denying intervention necessarily constituted a determination as to the applicability of the Norris-La-Guardia Act, even though the decision of the United States Supreme Court did not mention the Act.

2. In holding that Section 16 (12) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 16 (12)), providing that federal courts may issue injunctions to enforce orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, authorizes the issuance of injunctions in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes notwithstanding the restrictions imposed on the granting of such relief by the Norris-La-Guardia Act (29 U. S. C. A. Secs. 101-115).

3. In holding that in the suit brought by the plaintiff railroads to enjoin the performance of the collectively bargained contracts between the River Road and its employees on the theory that performance of such contracts is violative of the Interstate Commerce Commission order of 1922, such employees or their representatives are not indispensable parties.

4. In holding that Rule 52 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the court which grants a preliminary injunction to state findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action, does not apply to action taken on a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction made by a party who intervened of right after issuance of the injunction and who brought in new facts and who raised questions of law which were not passed on at the original issuance of the injunction, which injunction was based on a stipulation of facts not joined in by the intervenor of right.

5. In holding that the proper time to consider whether Section 5 (2)(f) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 5 (2)(f)), authorizing collective bargaining agreements for the protection of employees of a railroad carrier whose properties are taken over by an-

other carrier, provides a defense to an action brought to enjoin performance of such agreements on the ground that they are violative of an Interstate Commerce Commission order, is not in opposition to a preliminary injunction but at a trial upon the merits.

6. In holding that the proper time to consider whether a condition in an Interstate Commerce Commission order requiring a carrier to continue "traffic and operating relationships" with foreign lines can or should be construed to prohibit an agreement between the carrier and its employees providing that such employees may handle car movements on its tracks which were previously handled by foreign crews, is not in opposition to a preliminary injunction but at a trial upon the merits.

7. In holding that the proper time to consider whether it is in the public interest to enjoin performance of a collectively bargained contract between a carrier and its employees covering car movements on the carrier's own tracks on the ground that an Interstate Commerce Commission order requires that such movements be handled by foreign crews, is not in opposition to a preliminary injunction but at a trial upon the merits.

8. In refusing to hold that a preliminary injunction bond may not properly be conditioned so as to limit its protection among the persons enjoined to those who have intervened as parties and as to intervenors only for damages sustained after they have been allowed to intervene and their motion for a bond has reached the calendar of the trial judge.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

I.

This Court's Decision Has Been Misconstrued.

The earlier appeal to this Court involved only the question whether the Brotherhood had an absolute right to intervene, and this Court did not decide whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable. The Court of Appeals has misconstrued this Court's decision as determinative of the latter question, even though the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not mentioned in this Court's opinion. Certiorari should be granted to correct this misconception.

II.

The Interstate Commerce Act Has Been Erroneously Interpreted as Providing an Exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

The Court of Appeals has held in this case that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is inapplicable to an injunction suit brought under the Interstate Commerce Act, whereas the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be complied with in injunction suits involving or growing out of labor disputes regardless of the remedies provided under the Interstate Commerce Act. Certiorari should be granted to resolve this conflict.

III.

Rule 65(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure Has Been Incorrectly Interpreted to Mean That Employees of a Party, Irrespective of Their Interest, Cannot Be Indispensable Parties.

Even though acts done by River Road employees pursuant to their contract with the River Road prompted this suit, which was brought to enjoin performance of that contract, the Court of Appeals has held that River Road employees cannot be indispensable parties because Rule 65(d) provides that an injunction binds employees of a party, and the River Road has been made a party. Rule 65(d) is founded on the theory of representation, and was not intended to permit the issuance of injunctions against employees in their absence when their interests are directly affected by the suit and are in conflict with the interests of their employer.

IV.

Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure Has Been Incorrectly Interpreted as Not Applying to a Motion to Dissolve an Injunction, Even Though Findings and Conclusions on the Motion Are Necessary to Disposition of the Appeal.

When the Brotherhood was permitted to intervene of right as a defendant it moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction theretofore entered and brought in new facts and raised new legal points not before the District Court when the preliminary injunction was issued on the basis of a stipulation of facts to which the Brotherhood was not a party. On denying the Brotherhood's motion the District Court refused to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to dispose of the new issues, and the Court of Appeals

approved on the theory that Rule 52(a) does not apply to a motion to dissolve an injunction. This interpretation of the Rule destroys its purpose.

V.

A Preliminary Injunction Should Not Be Permitted to Stand Without Consideration of Legal Points Fundamental to the Propriety of Its Issuance.

When the Brotherhood was permitted to intervene of right it moved for reconsideration of the preliminary injunction, calling attention to a statute which on its face authorized the collective bargaining agreement performance of which the injunction forbade, to the public interest harmed by the injunction, and to the highly doubtful interpretation of the Commission's order on which the injunction was based. The District Court let the injunction stand without passing on these points, and the Court of Appeals said the points could be considered at the trial on the merits. This action violates principles of law governing issuance of preliminary injunctions and duty of a reviewing court to pass on issues fundamental to the further conduct of the case.

VI.

The Conditions of the Injunction Bond Covering Employees Should Be as Broad as the Injunction.

The Court of Appeals has sanctioned the District Court's refusal to require an injunction bond covering River Road trainmen for the period during which they were erroneously denied intervention. River Road employees are entitled to a bond for the entire period the injunction against them has been in effect. The trainmen should not be made to suffer for the court's error in denying their application for intervention.

ARGUMENT.

I.

The Court of Appeals Has Misconstrued This Court's Decision in the Instant Case as Holding That the Norris-LaGuardia Act Is Inapplicable.

The earlier appeal to this Court in the instant case involved one question: whether the Brotherhood had an absolute right to intervene in this proceeding. The answer to that question determined this Court's jurisdiction on appeal and the merits of the appeal as well. As this Court stated in the concluding paragraph of its opinion (*Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 331 U. S. 519, at 531-532):

“We thus conclude that Section 17 (11) [of the Interstate Commerce Act] gives the Brotherhood an absolute right to intervene in this proceeding, making it unnecessary to discuss whether, and to what extent, the Brotherhood would have had such a right apart from Section 17 (11). It follows that we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal on its merits. And in the exercise of that jurisdiction, we reverse the judgment of the District Court denying leave to the Brotherhood to intervene.”

Now the question is whether the above decision by this Court sustaining the Brotherhood's absolute right to intervene also constitutes an adverse determination of one of the principal defenses for which the Brotherhood sought intervention—the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court of Appeals has held that it does, reasoning as follows (R. 290-291):

“* * * in its brief in the Supreme Court in the *Brotherhood* case, *supra*, appellant argued that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was applicable; hence we believe

that the question of whether or not the Norris-LaGuardia Act was applicable is settled, since the Supreme Court was aware of the fact that Brotherhood, if intervention was allowed, would attack the jurisdiction of the District Court and would insist that the case was one to which the requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were applicable. In these circumstances the Supreme Court would, so we think, proceed to examine and determine not only its own jurisdiction but also the jurisdiction of the District Court, *M. C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan*, 111 U. S. 379, 382; *Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones*, 177 U. S. 449; *Kentucky v. Powers*, 201 U. S. 1, 35; and *Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Willard*, 220 U. S. 413, 419. If the District Court was without jurisdiction, the Supreme Court would have said so. We conclude that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not applicable."

The above cited authorities relied on by the Court of Appeals hold that where federal jurisdiction depends on diversity of citizenship or the existence of a federal question and such elements do not affirmatively appear, the court is bound to note lack of jurisdiction on its own motion. They do not hold that a decision which fails to note lack of jurisdiction constitutes an adjudication that jurisdiction exists. The Court of Appeals has applied such a rule to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, apparently on the theory that the Act is as much a part of the basic law of federal jurisdiction as the rule on diversity of citizenship, and that this Court, even though it did not mention the Norris-LaGuardia Act, is bound to have decided that it is not applicable.

If this were the law, then a plaintiff, in order to get his case into a federal court, should affirmatively allege the inapplicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This Court has said that such an allegation in a complaint merely anticipates a defense, and that when a case involving the applicability of the Act is improperly appealed to this

Court, it must be remanded for determination of the Norris-LaGuardia Act question by the Court of Appeals.

International L. G. W. Union v. Donnelly G. Co.,
304 U. S. 243.

On the motion to intervene the Act was mentioned only as an example of the inadequacy of the River Road's representation of its employees' interest (R. 98-99). It should be remembered also that the plaintiffs' complaint sought not only injunctive relief but also money damages (R. 11-12). We think it is plain that this Court was not bound, merely because the Norris-LaGuardia Act restricts a federal court's power to grant injunctive relief in certain cases, to decide the applicability of the Act in connection with an appeal from an order denying intervention.

Of much greater import is the question whether this Court actually intended to pass on the Norris-LaGuardia Act's applicability to this case. Since the Act is not mentioned in this Court's opinion, such silence on the subject should at least counsel caution against the conclusion that this Court intended to make any decision regarding the Act. If such an intention has been correctly inferred from this Court's silence, then this Court has done a most ironical thing: it has said that the Brotherhood may intervene, but by failing to say more it has thereby adjudicated against the Brotherhood the merits of one of the principal defenses for which intervention was sought. Because we are confident that this Court had no such intention, we submit that a writ of certiorari should be granted in order to correct a serious misconstruction of this Court's decision.

II.

The Court of Appeals Has Erroneously Interpreted the Interstate Commerce Act as Providing an Exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

We have seen that the Court of Appeals held that the question of the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to this case was settled by this Court in the earlier appeal. The Court of Appeals also held the Act inapplicable because this suit was brought under the Interstate Commerce Act, which the Court of Appeals considered a special statute providing an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which it deemed a general statute. As stated by the Court of Appeals (R. 290):

“* * * where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general, the special controls the general, and the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general. * * * Here there was no express repeal by Congress of Sec. 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act; on the contrary it was amended and re-enacted after the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.”

Thus the Court of Appeals has assumed that the Interstate Commerce Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act both deal with the same subject, and are in hopeless conflict. Even if we grant that these statutes are *pari materia* in that the Interstate Commerce Act provides for injunctions and the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides against them, it does not follow that one must always prevail and the other yield. When they are read together they simply mean that if an injunction is sought under the Interstate Commerce Act and the case involves or grows out of a labor dispute, plaintiff must satisfy both statutes. That was the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in

Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F. 2d 931 (1942) (certiorari denied in 317 U. S. 645) at 126 F. 2d 934:

“ * * * whatever other remedies may or may not be available, there is nothing in the exactions of the Motor Carrier Act [Part II, Interstate Commerce Act] which operates to enlarge beyond the limitations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act the jurisdiction of a United States Court in respect to the issuance of a restraining order or a temporary or permanent injunction in a controversy involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”

In 1947 the Fifth Circuit followed the *Lee Way* decision in a case involving the same question. *East Texas Motor Fr. L. v. International Brotherhood*, etc., 163 F. 2d 10. In that case, the court said (at p. 12):

“ * * * we are in no doubt that the case * * * is one arising out of a labor dispute. Neither are we in any doubt that since it is one so arising, plaintiff, not having complied, or attempted to comply, with the Norris-LaGuardia Act is in effect seeking to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts as limited by that act by its claim that the court should issue the injunction because the acts complained of are violations of duties or obligations arising under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1 *et seq.* *Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Keystone Freight Lines*, 10 Cir., 126 F. 2d 931, a case directly in point, so decides, and we are in no doubt that it was well decided.”

The holding of the Seventh Circuit in the instant case is obviously in conflict with both these decisions of other circuits.

If the Interstate Commerce Act, in providing for injunction suits, exempts the litigant who invokes its provisions from complying with the Norris-LaGuardia Act even though the case involves or grows out of a labor dispute, there is no reason for requiring compliance of a

plaintiff who brings his suit under any other federal statute containing provisions for injunctive relief.

In a broader sense, this decision is a step backward toward the view rejected by this court in *United States v. Hutcheson*, 312 U. S. 219, that trade union conduct which the Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts purport to protect may nevertheless be condemned and punished under the guise of enforcing some other federal statute. We submit that the present decision ought to be reviewed.

III.

The Court of Appeals Has Erroneously Construed Rule 65(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to Mean That Employees of a Party Cannot Be Indispensable Parties.

The preliminary injunction prohibited performance of the labor contracts covering the disputed work which were in effect between the River Road and its engineers, its firemen and enginemen, and its trainmen when this suit was filed. Referring to the trainmen's contract in connection with the earlier appeal, this Court said (331 U. S. 530):

“Acts done by the employees in performance of this contract obviously prompted this suit; and any such acts performed after the issuance of an injunction might give rise to contempt action.”

No River Road employees or their representatives were parties when the preliminary injunction was issued. The engineers, and the firemen and enginemen, are still not parties. The Court of Appeals has rejected the Brotherhood's contention that such employees are indispensable parties as follows (R. 292):

“The injunction was issued conformably to Rule 65(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and when we apply the rule that an injunction may issue against and be binding upon the employees of a party with-

out the employees being made parties to the suit, it is clear that the principle of indispensable party cannot be invoked in this case."

Rule 65(d) provides that an injunction is "binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise". The effect of the above holding is that irrespective of the nature of their interest in an injunction suit, employees of a party must be considered, by reason of Rule 65(d), as something less than indispensable parties.

In considering this question, we may note first that if Rule 65(d) was intended to deal with the subject of whether employees shall be made parties in injunction suits, then there is no vitality in Rule 65(e), which provides that none of the Rules modifies the statutes relating to injunction suits "affecting employer and employee". If Rule 65(d) does provide this exception to the general rule as to indispensability, then any labor contract which an employer finds onerous may be nullified by an injunction suit brought by third parties against the employer alone without the burden of meeting any defense which could be offered by the defendant's employees, who would be the real parties in interest.

The rule that an injunction binds the officers, agents, servants and employees of a party is obviously founded on the theory of representation. In this case the River Road does not represent the employment interests of its engineers, firemen and enginemen, or trainmen. These employees are represented in their employment rights by their respective brotherhoods. The River Road has even stated that it has interests in this suit which are in conflict with those of its employees (R. 129).

It is unthinkable that this Court, in adopting Rule 65(d),

intended that it be construed so as to impinge in this manner upon the guarantees provided in present labor statutes for separate employee representation. We therefore submit that Rule 65(d) was not designed to authorize, in injunction cases, the omission of parties who would in other cases be indispensable. The decision of the Court of Appeals, in that it construes this rule as conferring jurisdiction on a federal court to enjoin persons who are not before it, irrespective of their interest in the subject matter of the suit, merely because their employer has been made a party, fully warrants review by this Court.

IV.

Reconsideration of a Preliminary Injunction on Motion to Dissolve Made by a Subsequent Intervenor of Right Who Brings in New Issues Requires the Court to Make New Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Under Rule 52(a).

The Court of Appeals has limited the application of Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure so as to destroy its purpose. That Rule is in part as follows:

“* * * and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. * * *”

Of this Rule the Court of Appeals said:

“In our opinion Rule 52(a) applies in a case where the court grants or refuses an injunction. It does not apply on a motion to dissolve an injunction.” (R. 293.)

The facts of this case on the basis of which the Court of Appeals announced its limitation to the Rule are as follows:

On February 25, 1946, which was more than a year prior to the time the Brotherhood was permitted to intervene of right on September 26, 1947 (R. 138), the then parties entered into a stipulation of facts (R. 51-59). On the basis of this stipulation the court entered a preliminary injunction on March 14, 1946 (R. 59).

One of the findings of fact, paragraph 13, contained in the preliminary injunction order (R. 64) found the principal issue in favor of the plaintiffs and against the then defendants, namely, that the change in operating arrangements was a violation of the Interstate Commerce Commission order. Two of the conclusions of law, paragraph 4 (R. 65) and paragraph 8 (R. 66), decided the same issue in favor of the plaintiffs and against the then defendants.

No findings of fact or conclusions of law as to irreparable injury to the plaintiffs were contained in the preliminary injunction order. The answer thereafter filed denied any such injury (R. 9-10, 80-81).

Immediately after the Brotherhood was permitted to intervene of right as a defendant, it moved to vacate the preliminary injunction (R. 139-142), which motion was supported and opposed by affidavits (R. 142-157, 162-186, 188-222).

Included in the new questions of fact and law thus raised were the following:

- (1) Whether employees of the River Road, as trainmen, engineers, and firemen and enginemen were indispensable parties to this proceeding on March 14, 1946 and whether such engineers and firemen and enginemen are now indispensable parties to this proceeding.
- (2) Whether this case involves or grows out of a labor dispute.
- (3) Whether the collective bargaining agreement between the River Road and its employees is authorized by Section 5(2)(f) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 5(2)(f)).

(4) Whether it is in the public interest to grant the prayer of the plaintiffs' complaint for an injunction against the performance of the collective bargaining agreement between the River Road and its employees.

The Brotherhood's motion and the affidavits mentioned also put in issue whether the collective bargaining agreement between the River Road and its employees violated the Interstate Commerce Commission order of May 16, 1922 (R. 141) and whether the change in operating methods caused any delay in the movement of plaintiffs' cars (R. 147).

When the District Court denied the Brotherhood's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction it refused to make findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 251). The court explained its action when it declared that an intervenor takes the case as it is when he intervenes and is bound by all orders entered up to that time, and that since a complete set of findings of fact was entered previously, there was no need to re-state them (R. 258).

As a result of this action of the District Court, the Brotherhood and, it is believed, the Court of Appeals could only guess whether the District Court was deciding each of the issues raised by the Brotherhood adversely to the Brotherhood or making no disposition whatever of these issues on the theory that the intervenor of right was compelled to take the case as he found it. The injustice of this result, both to the Brotherhood and to the reviewing court, is patent.

When the Brotherhood as an intervenor of right who had not signed the stipulation of facts moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction and for summary judgment and brought in new facts and raised new issues, the District Court was confronted with a situation which in legal contemplation was exactly the same as if it were consider-

ing originally the question of whether a preliminary injunction should be granted.

It is respectfully suggested that the narrow construction placed by the Court of Appeals on Rule 52(a) signifies a failure to understand the purpose of the Rule. That purpose was stated by this Court in *Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Can. Co.*, 309 U. S. 310 at page 316:

"It is of the highest importance to a proper review of the action of a court in granting or refusing a preliminary injunction that there should be fair compliance with Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure."

The court continued at page 317:

"Moreover, if appellants conceived themselves aggrieved by the action of the court upon motion for preliminary injunction, they were entitled to have explicit findings of fact upon which the conclusion of the court was based. Such findings are obviously necessary to the intelligent and orderly presentation and proper disposition of an appeal."

The Brotherhood believes that the Court of Appeals in its limitation of Rule 52(a) has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, and has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

V.

Questions Fundamental to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction Must Be Passed on by the Reviewing Court When Presented to It.

When the Brotherhood attacked the preliminary injunction in the District Court by motion and affidavits it

invited the Court's attention to a statute which on its face authorized the collective bargaining agreement performance of which the injunction forbade (Section 5(2)(f) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 5(2)(f)) (R. 142). The Brotherhood also alleged that it was not in the public interest to enjoin performance of the collective bargaining agreement (R. 142) and cited a case almost identical on its facts in which a federal district court had denied an injunction as not in the public interest (*Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.*, 21 F. Supp. 282) (R. 99). The Brotherhood also alleged that the change in operating methods made pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement did not violate the Interstate Commerce Commission order (R. 141).

As already pointed out, when the Brotherhood as an intervenor of right moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction and for summary judgment and brought in new facts and raised new issues, the District Court was confronted with a situation which in legal contemplation was exactly the same as if it were considering originally the question of whether a preliminary injunction should be granted. The District Court therefore was considering the propriety of issuance of a preliminary injunction, not to maintain the status quo but to alter an existing situation, in the face of a statute which appeared to destroy the basis for the plaintiffs' suit, in the face of a case which held a request for a similar injunction to be not in the public interest, and in the face of facts brought in by affidavit which rendered highly doubtful the plaintiffs' interpretation of the Commission's order. The District Court let the preliminary injunction stand without consideration of these points on the theory that the Brotherhood as an intervenor was bound by all orders theretofore entered (R. 258).

The Brotherhood's efforts to have the Court of Appeals pass on these points were equally fruitless. As the Court said:

"We do not discuss these contentions because the proper time to consider them is upon a trial upon the merits, where appellant may avail itself of any defense it may have" (R. 293).

A preliminary injunction should not be granted if the pleadings and affidavits disclose that the plaintiffs' contentions in fact and in law are seriously disputed. *United States v. Weirton Steel Co.*, 7 F. Supp. 255, 265; *Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.*, 54 F. Supp. 649, 651. Further, the right asserted by the plaintiffs must be perfectly clear and free from doubt where the effect of a preliminary injunction will be more than merely the maintenance of the status quo. 43 C. J. S. Section 19, page 432. To authorize a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs must make out at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief. 43 C. J. S. Section 19, page 433.

The procedure which the Court of Appeals should have followed is that of this court in *United States v. General Motors Corp.*, 323 U. S. 373. In that case the Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment of the district court, had given instructions as to items of damage, and had remanded the cause for trial in accordance with its ruling. After this Court had granted certiorari it said, at page 377, of the above ruling of the Court of Appeals:

"We think we should review that ruling inasmuch as it is fundamental to the further conduct of the case. The correctness of the decision of the court below depends upon the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision: 'nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,' which conditions the otherwise unrestrained power of the sovereign to expropriate, without compensation, whatever it needs."

Certainly the legal points raised by the Brotherhood as an intervenor of right were fundamental to the further conduct of this case. The action of the Court of Appeals would subject the Brotherhood to the expense of a trial on the merits even though the statute, the public interest, and the question of interpretation of the Commission's order would require the denial of the injunction sought by the plaintiffs as soon as some court took the trouble to consider them on the record already made.

The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

VI.

The Court of Appeals Should Not Have Sanctioned the District Court's Refusal to Require an Adequate Bond to Protect Enjoined Employees.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals declined to discuss the questions raised by the Brotherhood concerning the several inadequacies of the injunction bond (R. 265) other than to say that no bond conditioned under the Norris-LaGuardia Act was required (R. 293). Thus the Court of Appeals has tacitly sanctioned the District Court's refusal to require a bond protecting the enjoined employees in any manner for the period between March 14, 1946, when the injunction against them was issued, and October 13, 1947, the date after River Road trainmen were allowed to intervene when their motion for bond reached the trial judge's calendar (R. 231). The bond for employees as required by the District Court was limited so as to cover trainmen only, and as to them only for damages sustained after October 13, 1947 (R. 261).

There is no doubt that the District Court could have

required plaintiffs, after the Brotherhood finally was allowed to intervene, to furnish a bond which would cover River Road employees as to losses sustained at all times since the original issuance of the injunction. *Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies' G. W. Union*, 55 F. Supp. 572, 584 (affirmed in 147 F. 2d 246, certiorari denied 325 U. S. 852). The question here is whether the Court could withhold such protection from River Road employees without serious departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.

In considering this question, it is immaterial whether the requirement of bond is governed by Rule 65(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure or Section 7(e) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 107(e)). Neither authorizes the issuance of an injunction with security less broad in its coverage than the injunction. The discretionary power in a district court to fix the amount of the security does not include the power to waive it entirely as to certain persons enjoined, or to exclude from its protection certain periods of time covered by the injunction.

The District Court denied the trainmen a bond to cover the period between March 14, 1946 and October 13, 1947 evidently on the theory that the Brotherhood, as an intervenor, "enters the case as it finds it" (R. 230), wherefore the coverage of the bond for trainmen should begin only after intervention. The plaintiffs were thus given an injunction without bond, at the trainmen's expense, during the time it took to correct the court's error in denying intervention. With no intention of appearing cynical, we suggest that the District Court seems to have been more willing to forgive plaintiffs for having been wrong on the question of intervention than to forgive the trainmen for having been right about it. The seriousness of this error on the part of the District Court becomes readily apparent

when it is remembered that recoverable losses of persons wrongfully enjoined are limited by the terms and to the amount of the injunction bond, as was held in the *Donnelly* case, *supra*, (147 F. 2d, at page 253). It follows that a failure by the court to require plaintiffs to furnish a proper bond can result in irreparable injury.

Conclusion.

For the reasons herein stated, we respectfully urge that this Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, grant the petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

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FILED

MAR 11 1949

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

CHARLES ELMORE GROUP
CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1948.

No. 548

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN,
Petitioner,

vs.

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD
COMPANY, ET AL.,
Respondents.

**BRIEF OF THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD
COMPANY, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS,
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION OF BROTHERHOOD
OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, INTERVENING DE-
FENDANT, FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.**

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March 11, 1949.



TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Statement of the Case	1
The Complaint of Plaintiffs-Respondents	1
Intervention by the Commission	5
Stipulation of Facts	5
The Preliminary Injunction	6
Answer of the River Road and the Central	6
Intervention by Appellant	7
Motions of Petitioner on Intervening	7
Petitioner's Appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Issues There Decided	9
Summary of Argument	10
Argument	14
I. The United States Court of Appeals Decided All Questions Before It and Properly Refused to Consider Issues Not Presented by Petitioner's Appeal	14
A. Petitioner's motion to vacate the preliminary injunction was based solely on an alleged lack of jurisdiction in the court below, and it was not entitled to urge other grounds in the Court of Appeals	15
B. Petitioner as an Intervener was not entitled to attack the preliminary injunction on grounds other than a lack of jurisdiction in the court to enter it	15
C. Petitioner's appeal was limited to the District Court's ruling on its motion to vacate the preliminary injunction and for an additional bond. It did not and could not appeal from the order overruling its motion for a summary judgment	16

II. The Decision of the Court of Appeals that the Norris-La Guardia Act is Inapplicable to This Suit Was Proper and There is No Occasion for This Court to Review the Same	21
A. The statement in the opinion of the Court of Appeals that it believed this Court had settled the question of the applicability of the Norris-La Guardia Act affords no ground for the issuance of a writ of certiorari	21
B. The Court of Appeals properly held the Norris-La Guardia Act not applicable to this suit and there is no decision by any Federal court which in any way conflicts with its decision . .	25
III. The Decision That the River Road Employees Are Not Indispensable Parties Affords No Ground for Review by This Court	26
IV. The Court of Appeals Properly Held That it Was Not Necessary for the District Court to Make Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Overruling Petitioner's Motion to Vacate the Preliminary Injunction	29
V. Petitioner Has No Cause to Complain of the Injunction Bond	30
Appendix	33

TABLE OF CASES.

Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. (2d) 464	19
Atchison Ry. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 193	18
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. U. S., 284 U. S. 288	21
Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410	19
A. Bryant Co. v. N. Y. Steam Fitting Co., 235 U. S. 327	24
Godfrey L. Cabot, Inc. v. Binney & Smith Co., 46 F. Supp. 346	24
Campana Corporation v. Harrison, 135 F. (2d) 334 ..	19
Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U. S. 431	27
Chi., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Willard, 220 U. S. 413	23
Chicago Junction Case, 71 I. C. C. 631	2, 3
Detroit Trust Co. v. Campbell River Timber Co., 98 F. (2d) 389	31
East Texas Motor Fr. L. v. International Brotherhood, Etc., 163 F. (2d) 10	25
Farrall v. District of Columbia Amateur Ath. Union, 153 F. (2d) 647	19
Florian v. United States, 114 F. (2d) 990	17
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449	23
Green Valley Creamery v. United States, 108 F. (2d) 342	19
Helvering v. Tex-Penn Co., 300 U. S. 481	15
Illinois Comm'n v. Thomson, 318 U. S. 675	19
Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F. (2d) 123, cert. den. 305 U. S. 651	17
Jordan, Ex Parte, 94 U. S. 248	16
Kansas, State of v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 95 F. (2d) 935	16

Kendrick v. Kendrick, 16 F. (2d) 744, cert. den. 273 U. S. 758	24
Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1	23
Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F. (2d) 931	25
Lennon, In re, 166 U. S. 548	27
Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571	15
M. C. & L. M. Railway Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 ..	23, 24
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199 ..	27
Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 83 F. (2d) 262, cert. den. 298 U. S. 689	29
N. Y. Central Securities Co. v. U. S., 287 U. S. 12 ..	21
Niles-Bement Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 254 U. S. 77	27
Pacific States Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176	15
Pianta v. H. M. Reich Co., 77 F. (2d) 888	24
Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O. R. Co., 331 U. S. 519	7, 12, 16, 21, 22, 23, 27
Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co., 72 F. (2d) 147	16
Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130	27
Smith v. Hoboken R. Co., 328 U. S. 123	21
Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522	21
Texas Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U. S. 157	24
Thompson v. Texas Mexican R. Co., 328 U. S. 134 ..	20
Toebeleman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F. (2d) 1016	19
Union Stock Yard Co. v. U. S., 308 U. S. 213	18
Union Trust Co. v. Jones, 16 F. (2d) 236	16
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157	15

U. S. v. California Canneries, 279 U. S. 553	16
United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225	21
Veach, In re, 4 F. (2d) 334	16
Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F. (2d) 305	19
Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253	15

OTHER CITATIONS.

Clayton Act	28
Equity Rule 70 $\frac{1}{2}$	29
Interstate Commerce Act:	
Section 5 (2)	21
Section 5 (2) (f)	20
Section 5 (8)	5
Section 16 (12)	1, 7, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26
Section 17 (11)	7, 28
Norris-LaGuardia Act ...	8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28
Rules of Civil Procedure:	
Rule 12	30
Rule 41 (b)	30
Rule 52 (a)	13, 29
Rule 56	30
Rule 56 (b)	8
Rule 56 (c)	19
Rule 65 (e)	28
Rule 65 (2)	13, 27, 30
28 U. S. C. A. Section 382	13, 30
49 U. S. C. A.:	
Section 16, Par. 12	1
Section 5 (2) (f)	8, 17, 20
Section 5 (8)	5



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TION OF BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, INTER-
VENING DEFENDANT, FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

It is believed that a more complete statement of the case than has been afforded by the petitioner will be of assistance to the Court.

The Complaint of Plaintiffs-Respondents (R. 2-47).

As shown by the complaint herein (R. 2-12), this suit was brought under Section 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 16, Par. 12) to enjoin disobedience of a condition in an order of the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission (hereinafter called the Commission) entered May 16, 1922, in the *Chicago Junction Case*, 71 I. C. C. 631.

Plaintiffs-Respondents (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) are seven* trunk line carriers engaged, *inter alia*, in the transportation by railroad of carload shipments of live-stock, other than hogs and sheep, from the Union Stock Yards, Chicago, Illinois, to destinations east and southeast of Chicago (R. 2, 3).

Defendants-Respondents (hereinafter referred to as defendants) are The New York Central Railroad Company, The Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Company and Chicago Junction Railway Company (hereinafter respectively referred to as the Central, the River Road and the Junction) (R. 2-3).

The Central is a trunk line carrier engaged, *inter alia*, in the same transportation as that of plaintiffs above referred to. The River Road is a switching line serving the Union Stock Yards, and all of its capital stock is now owned and was acquired by the Central on May 19, 1922, pursuant to authority granted by said order of May 16, 1922, on certain conditions. The Junction is a railroad company which on May 19, 1922, and on the same conditions, leased its entire railroad to the River Road for 99 years, and thereafter, at the option of the lessee, in perpetuity, which lease is still in effect (R. 3-5).

Said order of May 16, 1922, was entered on an application filed by the Central with the Commission on December 28, 1920. The Commission imposed various conditions upon its grant of authority in said order and provided that

* There were originally eight plaintiffs, but on June 7, 1947, the Pere Marquette Railway Company, one of the plaintiffs, was merged into The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, another of the plaintiffs, and on April 29, 1948, the District Court directed that the cause proceed in the names of the remaining seven plaintiffs (R. 276).

*"subject to the observance of"** said conditions the acquisition by the Central of the capital stock of the River Road and the leasing to the River Road of the property of the Junction *"will be in the public interest"* (R. 25).

The third condition (71 I. C. C., p. 639), which is still in force, provided:

"3. The present traffic and operating relationships existing between the Junction and River Road and all carriers operating in Chicago shall be continued, in so far as such matters are within the control of the Central." (R. 23.)

Prior to the Commission's order, the practice had been for the plaintiffs to use their own power and crews to move their empty and loaded livestock cars used in shipping livestock, other than hogs and sheep, from the Union Stock Yards, over the Junction tracks to and from the loading places in the Union Stock Yards. For the privilege of so moving their cars between their respective lines and said loading places, plaintiffs were charged \$1.00 per car, loaded and empty (R. 4). Referring to this operating practice the Commission, in its report accompanying the order of May 16, 1922, said (71 I. C. C., p. 633):

"All parties concede that that is the only practical method of handling that traffic." (R. 16.)

On January 25, 1946, the Central and the River Road notified plaintiffs that on and after February 1, 1946, plaintiffs would not be permitted to handle said cars as aforesaid, but cars destined for said loading places would have to be deposited by the plaintiffs at a point of interchange on the River Road lines, after which they would be moved by the River Road power and crews to the loading places, and after said cars were loaded, they would be moved by the River Road power and crews to a point of interchange on

* Emphasis ours throughout unless otherwise indicated.

the River Road lines from which point they could be picked up by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were further notified that the charge of the River Road for such handling would be \$12.96 per outbound loaded car instead of the former charge of \$1.00 per car, loaded or empty (R. 6-7).

The movement so required by the Central and the River Road on and after February 1, 1946, did not involve any fewer hours of service by the power and crews of the plaintiffs than had been required by the former movement (R. 8), resulted in substantial delay in placing cars for loading and in removing loaded cars, with the result that some shipments would require an additional unloading for rest, water and feeding to avoid violation of the law, and the ultimate delay so resulting would cause such shipments and other shipments moving in the same trains to miss the market for which they were intended (R. 9).

The change thus required by the Central and the River Road deprived plaintiffs of trackage rights over the line of the River Road to said Union Stock Yards and of direct access to said yards for the movement of the livestock in question, as a result of which plaintiffs had been and would be prevented from dealing directly with the shippers of such livestock in the placing, loading and removing of cars, in which activities they would be dependent upon the Central and the River Road for the performance of services to the shippers, with the result that the plaintiffs would no longer be able to see that the shippers received satisfactory service and so maintain their good will (R. 9-10).

On February 1, 1946, the Central and the River Road proceeded to act in accordance with said notice of January 25, 1946, and this suit was brought by the plaintiffs on February 12, 1946, to compel obedience to said Condition 3 in said order, it being alleged that the aforesaid action of the defendants was in violation of said condition (R. 7-12).

Intervention by the Commission (R. 47-50).

On February 21, 1946, the Commission filed its complaint of intervention, alleging that the action of the Central and the River Road in making the change in operations which is above outlined "constituted and was discontinuance in part of 'the present traffic and operating relationships existing between the Junction and River Road' and the plaintiffs herein" and was and is in violation of said order of May 16, 1922; that by Section 5 (8) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A. Section 5 (8)) the Commission was authorized to seek, and the district courts of the United States were given jurisdiction to afford, injunctive or mandatory relief to restrain violation of or compel obedience to an order issued under Section 5 of that Act, and asking that preliminary and permanent injunctions be entered restraining the violation of said order of May 16, 1922, and Condition 3 thereof.

Stipulation of Facts (R. 51-58).

For the purposes of a hearing on the motions for a preliminary injunction, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, reciting the entry of the Commission's order and Condition 3 thereof, the operating practices obtaining prior to February 1, 1946, and the change brought about on said date as above set forth. The stipulation also recited that the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, petitioner herein, bargaining agent for the River Road trainmen, having failed to settle certain disputes—among others a demand, claimed by said Brotherhood to be based upon a contract with the River Road, that River Road trainmen be given the work of moving and switching the livestock cars hereinabove referred to—notified the River Road under authority of an almost unanimous strike vote of said trainmen,

that unless said disputes were settled before 10:30 P. M., January 23, 1946, River Road trainmen would go out on strike at that hour. Under continued threat of such a strike the River Road shortly before the hour set for said strike made an agreement with said Brotherhood which, among other things, provided that said work of moving and switching livestock cars be given to River Road trainmen.

The Preliminary Injunction (R. 59-68).

On March 14, 1946 (R. 59), the District Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants, "their respective officers, agents, representatives, employees and successors, and all other persons in active concert and participation with them," from failing and neglecting to obey said order of May 16, 1922, with respect to the transportation of livestock other than hogs and sheep from said Union Stock Yards, and from violating Condition 3 of said order in the like respect, and commanding them to permit plaintiffs to move their said cars over the line of the River Road as had been the practice prior to February 1, 1946 (R. 65-66).

Answer of the River Road and the Central (R. 78-86).

On May 6, 1946 (R. 78), the River Road and the Central filed a sworn answer (R. 84) in which, among other things, they denied that they or either of them "have violated Condition 3 or any other part of the report and order of the Interstate Commerce Commission of May 16, 1922," and denied "that Condition 3 * * * is applicable to or imposes any duty upon the defendant, River Road" (R. 81).

The answer also contained extended allegations concerning the dispute with the petitioner, representing the River Road trainmen, the strike threat, and settlement with peti-

tioner, which was summarized as aforesaid in the stipulation of facts.

Intervention by Appellant.

On March 18, 1946, petitioner's motion for leave to appear specially for the purpose of moving the court to vacate the preliminary injunction was denied (R. 70-71). On May 20, 1946 (R. 94), petitioner presented its petition to intervene as a defendant, which was denied on November 7, 1946. On direct appeal, this Court reversed the order denying intervention, holding that this suit was authorized by Section 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act, and that petitioner had an absolute right to intervene under Section 17 (11) of that Act, because the interests of the River Road trainmen, whom it represented, would be affected, inasmuch as they would be bound by any judgment which might be entered in the case. *Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O. R. Co.*, 331 U. S. 519. Pursuant to the mandate of this Court, on September 26, 1947, the District Court permitted the petitioner to intervene.

Motions of Petitioner on Intervening.

On the day it intervened, petitioner filed its motions (1) to vacate the preliminary injunction, (2) to assess damages against plaintiffs for the wrongful issuance thereof, (3) for a summary judgment, and (4) for leave to answer the complaint if the motion for summary judgment was denied (R. 139-142).^{*} The first and third of these motions require further notice.

Two grounds were assigned for the motion to vacate the preliminary injunction, both going to the jurisdiction of the

^{*} These motions were identical with the motions which were tendered by petitioner with its petition to intervene on May 20, 1946 (R. 103-106, 139-142) and which were a part of the record on petitioner's appeal to this Court.

court. One ground was that the trainmen, engineers, firemen and enginemen of the River Road were indispensable parties in the absence of which the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter (R. 139). The other ground was that the suit involved a labor dispute, the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to issue any injunction (R. 140-141).

Petitioner's motion for a summary judgment in its favor under Rule 56 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure was based upon two grounds. The first was an alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because of a failure to join as alleged indispensable parties engineers, firemen and enginemen employed by the River Road (R. 141). The second ground was for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Three reasons were assigned for this second ground. They were (1) failure of plaintiffs to comply with the Norris-LaGuardia Act; (2) the complaint did not allege a violation of the Commission's order; and (3) if it did allege such violation, then (a) the Commission did not have jurisdiction to issue the order, (b) 49 U. S. C. A. Section 5 (2) (f) was applicable and (c) the public interest required that no injunction issue (R. 141-142).

Attached to said motions was an affidavit by one of petitioner's officers (R. 142-148) alleging various matters apparently designed to form the basis for an argument that the claim of the River Road trainmen to do the switching work in question had its origin in an agreement which antedated the Commission's order and that properly construed Condition 3 of the order was not violated by the change in operations which was enjoined. In reply the plaintiffs filed counter affidavits and evidence (R. 162-186), which were followed by additional affidavits by petitioner (R. 188-198),

and then by further affidavits and evidence on the part of the plaintiffs (R. 198-222).*

Three days after intervening and filing the aforesaid motions, petitioner filed its motion to require plaintiffs to give an additional bond for not less than \$100,000 conditioned as required by the Norris-LaGuardia Act to guarantee the River Road trainmen, firemen and engineers against loss from the wrongful issuance of said injunction and to secure their attorneys' fees (R. 158-160).

On February 26, 1948, the District Court entered an order overruling the motion to vacate the preliminary injunction and the motion for summary judgment but directing that plaintiffs give an additional bond in the sum of \$25,000 conditioned upon the payment of such damages as the River Road trainmen might be found to have sustained after October 13, 1947, due to the issuance of said preliminary injunction, if it should be found that such injunction was wrongfully issued (R. 260-261).

Petitioner's Appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Issues There Decided.

On March 25, 1948, petitioner filed its notice of appeal "from so much of the order * * * as denies the motion of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen to vacate and dissolve the preliminary injunction and from so much of said order * * * as requires the plaintiffs to file their bond only

* While of no particular pertinence in connection with the questions now before this Court, we wish to make the point that factual statements, particularly on pages 2 and 3 of the petition, relative to the switching work claimed to have been done by the River Road trainmen prior to February 1, 1946, and the length of time they had been urging the right to do all such work, based on record references to said affidavits, are not conceded by plaintiffs. If, at any stage of this case, it should be held that such matters are pertinent, they can only be tried on a hearing on the merits and not on affidavits filed in connection with a motion for summary judgment.

in the sum of \$25,000 and conditioned as provided in said order" (R. 261-262). On November 11, 1948, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court (R. 294).

In its opinion (R. 285-293) it held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not applicable to this suit (R. 288-291), that the River Road trainmen, engineers, firemen, and enginemen were not indispensable parties (R. 291-292), that the District Court was not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in overruling petitioner's motion to vacate the preliminary injunction, and that since the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not applicable to the suit the District Court did not err in failing to require respondents to file a Norris-LaGuardia Act bond (R. 293).

The court thus held against the petitioner on the two jurisdictional points raised by its motion to vacate the preliminary injunction. It ruled that the other points, which were raised by the petitioner's motion for a summary judgment, were not before it, stating that the proper time to consider them is upon a trial of the merits, when petitioner might avail itself of any defense it might have (R. 293).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

I.

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED ALL QUESTIONS BEFORE IT AND PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER ISSUES NOT PRESENTED BY PETITIONER'S APPEAL.

The Court of Appeals decided three questions, namely: (1) that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not applicable to this suit, (2) that River Road employees are not indispensable parties, and (3) that in overruling petitioner's motion to vacate the preliminary injunction it was not necessary for

the District Court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The decision was properly so limited because

1. Petitioner's motion to vacate the preliminary injunction was based upon only two grounds, both of which went to the jurisdiction of the Court, namely: (1) that plaintiffs had not complied with the Norris-LaGuardia Act which was applicable, and (2) that there was a lack of indispensable parties because River Road employees were not joined. Petitioner cannot complain because the Court of Appeals did not consider other grounds not assigned for the motion in the District Court.

2. Petitioner as an intervener was not entitled to attack the preliminary injunction on grounds other than a lack of jurisdiction in the Court to enter it.

3. Petitioner's appeal was limited to the District Court's ruling on its motion to vacate the preliminary injunction and for an additional bond. It did not and could not appeal from the order overruling its motion for a summary judgment.

The questions, decision of which petitioner claims the Court of Appeals improperly deferred until a hearing on the merits, arose out of matters assigned by petitioner in support of its motion for a summary judgment and were not properly before the Court of Appeals.

The preliminary injunction in fact preserved the *status quo* as it had existed for more than a quarter of a century and it was eminently proper that the Court should retain the injunction and defer consideration of questions not going to its jurisdiction until a hearing on the merits.

II.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE NORRIS-LA GUARDIA ACT IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS SUIT WAS PROPER AND THERE IS NO OCCASION FOR THIS COURT TO REVIEW THE SAME.

The Court of Appeals considered on its merits petitioner's contention that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable to this suit, gave its reasons for its decision and then stated that in its opinion that question was settled by the decision of this Court in *Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O. R. Co.*, 331 U. S. 519. Petitioner cannot complain of the statement of the Court of Appeals that it believed this Court had decided the question because (1) the Court of Appeals did not treat the question as *res judicata* but reached an independent decision of the question on its merits, and (2) because the Court of Appeals could not have reasonably come to any other conclusion.

The Norris-LaGuardia Act is not applicable to this suit for the reasons set forth in plaintiffs' brief on petitioner's appeal to this Court, an excerpt from which discussing that question is set forth in an appendix to this brief. Furthermore, fundamentally and generically this case is not the type of case to which it was intended that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should apply.

III.

THE DECISION THAT THE RIVER ROAD EMPLOYEES ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES AFFORDS NO GROUND FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT.

The question as to whether River Road employees were indispensable parties was argued in this Court on petitioner's appeal. The necessary effect of this Court's decision on that appeal was to hold that River Road employees are not indispensable parties.

If the plaintiffs prevail in this suit, the River Road will need a lesser number of hours of labor and consume a lesser amount of commodities used in the operation of switch engines than would be the case if defendants prevail. It is obvious that the River Road employees, who supply the labor, stand in no different relation to this suit than would any supplier of materials who had a contract with the River Road to supply its requirements of fuel, lubricants or other commodities needed in the operation or maintenance of switch engines. Manifestly neither would be an indispensable party.

IV.

**IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO MAKE
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
IN RULING ON PETITIONER'S MOTION TO VACATE THE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.**

The decision of the Court of Appeals is in accord with the only other decision involving a rule similar to Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the question. Rule 52(a), as amended by this Court on December 27, 1946, makes it perfectly plain that no findings of fact and conclusions of law were necessary.

V.

**PETITIONER HAS NO CAUSE TO COMPLAIN OF THE
INJUNCTION BOND.**

At the time it granted the preliminary injunction the Court, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 65 (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U. S. C. A., § 382, by order required the plaintiffs to give and in due course by order approved an injunction bond. Petitioner as an intervener could not as a matter of right demand that the bond be increased, but the court in its discretion increased the

amount of the bond so that petitioner was given more than it had a right to demand. Furthermore, there was no evidence before the District Court as to the amount of damages which the River Road trainmen might sustain by reason of the injunction.

ARGUMENT.

I.

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED ALL QUESTIONS BEFORE IT AND PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER ISSUES NOT PRESENTED BY PETITIONER'S APPEAL.

The petitioner states eight questions which it claims are presented by its petition (pp. 7-8), assigns eight reasons for the allowance of the writ (pp. 9-11), and makes eight specifications of error (pp. 14-16). Inasmuch as the last four of said questions presented, reasons assigned and errors specified are based on the failure of the court to pass upon questions which petitioner contends it should have decided, it becomes important to consider what was properly before the Court of Appeals for decision.

A brief review of the record makes it apparent that the only question before the Court of Appeals was in substance the question whether the District Court had jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction. If answered in the affirmative, there was the incidental question of whether the District Court should have made findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying petitioner's motion to vacate the injunction.

There are several reasons why the questions before the Court of Appeals were so limited.

A.**Petitioner's Motion to Vacate the Preliminary Injunction Was Based Solely on an Alleged Lack of Jurisdiction in the Court Below, and It Was Not Entitled to Urge Other Grounds in the Court of Appeals.**

Petitioner's motion to vacate the preliminary injunction was based on two grounds, both of which went directly to the jurisdiction of the court (R. 139-141). One ground was that the River Road trainmen, engineers, firemen and enginemen or their representatives were indispensable parties without which the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction. The other ground was that the complaint did not comply with the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This ground also went directly to the jurisdiction of the court.

Since petitioner's motion to vacate the preliminary injunction was based only on the two jurisdictional grounds, it cannot now complain that the Court of Appeals failed to consider other grounds not assigned in support of the motion in the District Court. *Helvering v. Tex-Penn Co.*, 300 U. S. 481, 498; *United States v. Atkinson*, 297 U. S. 157; *Pacific States Co. v. White*, 296 U. S. 176, 186; *Lynch v. United States*, 292 U. S. 571, 587; *Young v. Masci*, 289 U. S. 253, 261.

B.**Petitioner as an Intervener Was Not Entitled to Attack the Preliminary Injunction on Grounds Other Than a Lack of Jurisdiction in the Court to Enter It.**

Petitioner, as an intervener, was precluded from attacking the preliminary injunction on other than jurisdictional grounds. It would seem that if a court is totally without

jurisdiction over a suit, an intervener would not be precluded from calling such matter to its attention, not as the privilege of an intervener, but because a court is bound to take notice of a total lack of jurisdiction from whatever source it may come, or even upon its own motion, and order dismissal of the suit. Beyond this, it is clear that an intervener is precluded from attacking orders or decrees entered in the case prior to intervention. *U. S. v. California Canneries*, 279 U. S. 553, 556; *Ex Parte Jordan*, 94 U. S. 248, 252.

The rule is clearly inferable from the opinion of this Court on petitioner's appeal, wherein it was said (331 U. S., p. 524):

"And since he cannot appeal from any *subsequent* order or judgment in the proceeding unless he does intervene, the order denying intervention has the degree of definitiveness which supports an appeal therefrom."

The clear inference, of course, is that an intervener can appeal from or question only an order or judgment entered subsequent to his intervention. The lower federal courts have announced and followed this rule many times.*

C.

Petitioner's Appeal Was Limited to the District Court's Ruling on Its Motion to Vacate the Preliminary Injunction and for an Additional Bond. It Did Not and Could Not Appeal from the Order Overruling Its Motion for a Summary Judgment.

As previously noted, aside from the question as to the amount and conditions of the injunction bond, petitioner

* *Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co.*, 72 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 7); *State of Kansas v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.*, 95 F. (2d) 935, 936 (C. C. A. 10); *Union Trust Co. v. Jones*, 16 F. (2d) 236, 239 (C. C. A. 4); *In re Veatch*, 4 F. (2d) 334, 336 (C. C. A. 8).

appealed from only so much of the order of the District Court as denied its motion to vacate the preliminary injunction (R. 261-262, 288). It did not and, as a matter of fact, could not appeal from the order overruling its motion for summary judgment.*

Petitioner's claims that, properly construed, Condition 3 of the Commission's order was not violated by the change in operations enjoined by the preliminary injunction, but that if it should be held to the contrary, then 49 U. S. C. A. Section 5 (2) (f) is applicable and nullifies the Condition and the public interest requires that no injunction be issued, were all matters asserted in support of its motion for summary judgment and not in support of its motion to vacate the preliminary injunction (R. 141-142). They were, therefore, not questions properly before the Court of Appeals on petitioner's appeal. Referring to these contentions the Court of Appeals said (R. 293):

"We do not discuss these contentions because the proper time to consider them is upon a trial upon the merits, where appellant may avail itself of any defense it may have."

For the foregoing reasons it is perfectly apparent that the Court of Appeals was merely following long established and universally accepted practice when it deferred consideration of the questions which it did not pass on until the trial on the merits.

However, we note briefly petitioner's contention (pp. 30-33) that the court by issuing the injunction had upset the *status quo*; that the points left undecided were fundamental to the further conduct of the case; and that if any court

* An order overruling a motion for summary judgment is not a final and appealable order. *Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 108 F. (2d) 123, 125 (C. C. A. 5), cert. den. 305 U. S. 651; *Florian v. United States*, 114 F. (2d) 990, 993 (C. C. A. 7).

would take the trouble to look into them, plaintiffs would be denied relief without putting the petitioner to the expense of a trial on the merits.

In the first place, the preliminary injunction in fact restored the *status quo* as it had existed for more than a quarter of a century until the River Road trainmen through the threat of a strike that would have tied up the industrial heart of Chicago at a critical time, prevailed upon their employer, the River Road, to deny plaintiffs the right to operate their trains over its lines (R. 8).

On the sworn allegations of the complaint (R. 8), which are in no way contradicted by any affidavits of petitioner, the amount of work done by the plaintiffs' power and crews was not decreased, but was just as great after the change brought about on February 1, 1946, as it had been before that date. In other words, it was no more work for plaintiffs to spot the empty cars for loading at the Union Stock Yards' loading chutes and then remove the loaded cars from the chutes, than it was for them to switch the empty cars to an interchange yard on the River Road line (whence they were switched by the River Road crews to the loading chutes and, after loading, back to the interchange yard) and switch the loaded cars from the interchange yard to plaintiffs' own lines. The so-called settlement contract between the River Road and the petitioner was nothing more or less than a make work agreement which needlessly doubled the switching for the traffic involved in a highly congested industrial section of Chicago. Without the least compensatory advantage plaintiffs were subjected to a net increased cost of \$10.96 for each loaded car handled, which was collected from them by their competitor, and at the same time that competitor deprived them of valuable terminal rights.* Furthermore,

* This Court has twice held that the Chicago Union Stock Yards are the livestock terminals of the line-haul carriers, *Atchison Ry. v. U. S.*, 295 U. S. 193, 195; *Union Stock Yard Co. v. U. S.*, 308 U. S. 213, 219.

if, as petitioner contends, the affidavits filed in connection with its motion for summary judgment are to be examined in connection with its motion to vacate the preliminary injunction, it is perfectly apparent that the sworn allegations of the complaint (R. 9-12) concerning the resulting delay in livestock shipments brought about by the change in operations on February 1, 1946, are fully borne out by the evidence taken by the Commission in the proceedings in which its order was entered (R. 200-201, 204-205, 212, 213, 215).

Under the circumstances, it seems apparent that any court would have been remiss in its duty had it not by preliminary injunction maintained the *status quo* as it had existed for so many years pending the determination of the case on its merits.

As to petitioner's suggestion that affidavits filed by it raised a doubt as to plaintiffs' interpretation of the Commission's order and for this reason the court should have vacated the preliminary injunction, it seems reasonably clear that a court would not be warranted in going beyond the Commission's interpretation of its own order in a case such as this.* But if it had considered the affidavits, it would have found that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the plaintiffs' and the Commission's interpretation (R. 198-215).†

* *Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co.*, 325 U. S. 410, 413-414; *Illinois Comm'n. v. Thomson*, 318 U. S. 675, 685; *Green Valley Creamery v. United States*, 108 F. (2d) 342 (C. C. A. 1).

† It is, of course, elementary law that if the court had decided not to accept the Commission's interpretation of its own order, the question of the proper construction of the order could not be tried on opposing affidavits filed on a motion for summary judgment. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 (c); *Campana Corporation v. Harrison*, 135 F. (2d) 334, 335 (C. C. A. 7); *Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.*, 130 F. (2d) 1016, 1018 (C. C. A. 3); *Arnstein v. Porter*, 154 F. (2d) 464, 471 (C. C. A. 2); *Farrall v. District of Columbia Amateur Ath. Union*, 153 F. (2d) 647, 648 (U. S. C. A. Dist. of Col.); *Whitaker v. Coleman*, 115 F. (2d) 305, 306 (C. C. A. 5).

To construe Section 5 (2) (f) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A., Section 5 (2) (f)) according to petitioner's contentions (p. 31) would be to hold that Congress, after expressly authorizing the Commission to impose conditions in the public interest in approving an application under Section 5 of the Act, did in the same section authorize agreements which would nullify those conditions. It is unthinkable that Congress would do any such thing. Furthermore, such holding would be directly contrary to the decision of this Court in *Thompson v. Texas Mexican R. Co.*, 328 U. S. 134, 147, which decided that the jurisdiction of the Commission over the terms and conditions of trackage rights is exclusive and that not even the courts have the authority to interfere with the prerogatives of the Commission in that regard.

Petitioner's suggestion that even though the court should find that the Commission's order was violated by the change in operations on February 1, 1946, the public interest would require that no injunction issue, is novel to say the least. Section 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act under which this suit is brought is mandatory in its requirements, in that it provides that if the

"court determines that the order was regularly made and duly served, and that the carrier is in disobedience of the same, *the court shall enforce obedience to such order* by a writ of injunction or other proper process, mandatory or otherwise."

Petitioner's contention, therefore, amounts to nothing more than the assertion that public interest requires that the court should refuse to perform an obligation made mandatory upon it by an Act of Congress and so deny to plaintiffs the only remedy available for the protection of valuable operating rights over the lines of the River Road which were confirmed and perpetuated by the Commission's order, and to the Commission the only remedy avail-

able for the enforcement of a condition which it was authorized to and did impose in the public interest (R. 25).*

II.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE NORRIS-LA GUARDIA ACT IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS SUIT WAS PROPER AND THERE IS NO OCCASION FOR THIS COURT TO REVIEW THE SAME.

As appears from its opinion (R. 288-291), the Court of Appeals considered on its merits petitioner's contention that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable to this suit, held that the cases relied on by petitioner were not in point and that under well known rules of statutory construction it was manifest that Congress did not intend that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should apply to suits brought under Section 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act to enforce orders of the Commission. It then stated it believed that the question was settled by the decision of this Court on petitioner's appeal in *Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O. R. Co.*, 331 U. S. 519.

A.

The Statement in the Opinion of the Court of Appeals That It Believed This Court Had Settled the Question of the Applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act Affords No Ground for the Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari.

We first consider petitioner's contention (pp. 20-22) that certiorari should be granted because the Court of Appeals misconstrued this Court's decision on petitioner's appeal.

* The criterion by which the Commission is guided in imposing conditions under orders issued under Section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act is the public interest. *N. Y. Central Securities Co. v. U. S.*, 287 U. S. 12 (p. 24); *Texas v. United States*, 292 U. S. 522 (p. 530); *United States v. Lowden*, 308 U. S. 225, 229-230; *Smith v. Hoboken R. Co.*, 328 U. S. 123, 130; *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. U. S.*, 284 U. S. 288, 295.

The Court of Appeals did not treat the question of the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as *res judicata*, but first considered the question on its merits and reached a conclusion adverse to petitioner on its own independent judgment. Having thus given independent consideration to the question, and having reached, on grounds fully stated, a decision that the Act was inapplicable, it cannot be said that its construction of this Court's decision caused it to reach a decision adverse to petitioner. At most it can only be said that its belief that this Court had settled the question reinforced its conviction that its own decision was correct.

On the record there would seem to be no possible doubt but that the belief that this Court had settled the question is well founded. As shown by its opinion, this Court fully understood the relations between petitioner and those whom it represents and the other parties to the suit. The pertinent facts were just as apparent on the record then before this Court as they are on the record now.

Furthermore the question of the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was fully argued before this Court. The petitioner there contended that the Act was applicable, that the allegations of the complaint failed to meet the requirements of the Act, and that hence no injunctive relief (the only relief authorized by Section 16 (12)) could be granted, and that the defendants were not properly defending the suit inasmuch as they had not raised that question.* Nevertheless, this Court stated (331 U. S. 519, at p. 529):

"The instant case is a ready illustration of a judicial proceeding arising under this Act; a suit of this nature is authorized solely by Section 16 (12) of the Act."

* See appendix to this brief for plaintiffs' discussion of the question in their brief on petitioner's appeal. For petitioner's discussion of this question, see its brief in that case, pp. 28-31, and its reply brief, pp. 18-21.

And it was held that petitioner had an unconditional right to intervene because this suit was so authorized.

This Court further held (331 U. S., at p. 531) that the River Road employees would be "bound by any judgment that might be entered in the case." This language is open to no other construction than that this Court considered that this suit was properly brought under Section 16 (12) and that the court had jurisdiction thereunder to grant the only type of relief provided for by that section, namely, injunctive relief, particularly since on every appeal to it the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, not only of this Court, but also of the court from which the record comes. Thus in *M. C. & L. M. Railway Co. v. Swan*, 111 U. S. 379, this Court, in holding that the court below did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, although the question was not presented to this Court by either party, said (p. 382):

"* * * the rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States, is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, *of its own motion*, to deny its own jurisdiction, and, *in the exercise of its appellate power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record on which in the exercise of that power, it is called to act. On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it.*"

In *Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones*, 177 U. S. 449; *Kentucky v. Powers*, 201 U. S. 1; and *Chi., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Willard*, 220 U. S. 413, this Court quoted in full and followed the above quoted language from the *Swan* case.

It would therefore seem that the doctrine of the *Swan case* was clearly applicable to this Court's decision on petitioner's appeal and that it was futile to contend now that the question of jurisdiction was not disposed of by this Court's earlier decision.

Petitioner suggests (p. 22) that the complaint also seeks damages apparently in the belief that this would explain the allowance of the intervention even though the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied. However, this Court held in terms that the suit would lie under Section 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act and it is clear that it would not have lain as a suit for damages for lack of diversity of citizenship (R. 2-3).

If petitioner's contention that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable to this case is correct, not only did jurisdiction not affirmatively appear on the record but lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appeared. Since the very idea of intervention implies the existence of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in which intervention may be had,* the decision of this Court that petitioner was entitled to intervene in this suit necessarily presupposed that this was a suit of which the District Court had jurisdiction.

It can hardly be supposed that this Court would have engaged in an act so frivolous as the issuance of its mandate to the court below directing that it permit petitioner to intervene in a suit of which it had no jurisdiction, or that it intended to put the parties litigant to the expense of carrying this suit before it a second time before even reaching a hearing on the merits in order that the basic question of the jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain it could be authoritatively decided.

* *Texas Cement Co. v. McCord*, 233 U. S. 157, 163; *A. Bryant Co. v. N. Y. Steam Fitting Co.*, 235 U. S. 327, 337, 338, 342; *Kendrick v. Kendrick*, 16 F. (2d) 744, 745 (C. C. A. 5) (cert. den. 273 U. S. 758); *Pianta v. H. M. Reich Co.*, 77 F. (2d) 888, 890 (C. C. A. 2); and *Godfrey L. Cabot, Inc. v. Binney & Smith Co.*, 46 F. Supp. 346, 347.

Manifestly, the Court of Appeals reached the only reasonably tenable conclusion when it said (R. 291), "If the District Court was without jurisdiction, the Supreme Court would have said so."

B.

The Court of Appeals Properly Held the Norris-LaGuardia Act Not Applicable to This Suit and There Is No Decision by Any Federal Court Which in Any Way Conflicts With Its Decision.

We shall not burden this Court with another discussion of the question of the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to this suit. We have printed as an appendix to this brief that portion of plaintiffs' brief as appellees on petitioner's appeal to this Court in which that question was discussed and the cases then relied on by petitioner distinguished. The case of *East Texas Motor Fr. L. v. International Brotherhood, Etc.*, 163 F. (2d) 10, also relied on by petitioner here, is practically identical on its facts and holdings with *Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines*, 126 F. (2d) 931, which we there considered. It adds nothing to that case and is distinguishable from the instant case on the same grounds.

It should be apparent on a moment's reflection that fundamentally and generically this is not the type of case to which it was intended that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should apply. The question here involved is highly important from the standpoint of the plaintiffs, the defendant carriers and the public at large. As to the traffic involved, it is the question whether the plaintiffs are to continue to have the immensely valuable right of operating their trains directly between their own lines and the Union Stock Yards' loading chutes for a small trackage charge or whether the defendant carriers can deprive them of termi-

nal facilities at those yards which they have always enjoyed, and introduce two utterly needless switching operations in the handling of their cars at an additional cost to them of approximately \$11.00 per car with no resulting saving in hours of service of power or crews but with a consequent delay in the handling of the livestock to the detriment of both the plaintiffs and the public. Such is the question at issue in this suit. By Section 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act Congress has made available an orderly method by which the rights of the plaintiffs, the defendant carriers and the public as represented by the Commission are required to be determined and enforced according to their merits and the law of the land. Yet petitioner, representing trainmen whose only interest in the questions is whether or not they shall have or be denied the privilege of doing as trainmen the work incidental to the two needless switching operations, insists that under the Norris-LaGuardia Act the court is powerless to entertain the suit and to enforce as against them its decision in the premises. It is respectfully submitted Congress did not intend by that Act to set apart petitioner and those whom it represents and place them above and beyond the law by which the rights of ordinary litigants and the public are to be determined.

III.

THE DECISION THAT THE RIVER ROAD EMPLOYEES ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES AFFORDS NO GROUND FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT.

Petitioner cites no authority to support its contention (pp. 25-27) that River Road employees are indispensable parties to this suit.

Section 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act provides that the injunction shall run against the offending carrier

and "its officers, agents, or representatives." Rule 65 (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that injunctions issued pursuant thereto shall be binding "upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." Both the statute and Rule recognize the elementary rule of law that an injunction may issue against and be binding on the agents and employees of a party without their being made parties to the suit, because to hold otherwise would enable a defendant to nullify the decree by carrying out the prohibited acts through its agents, servants or employees, or those identified with it. *Chase National Bank v. Norwalk*, 291 U. S. 431, 436, 440; *In re Lennon*, 166 U. S. 548, 554.

The plaintiffs in asking and the court in granting an injunction against the River Road employees merely followed the required procedure.

On its appeal to this Court, petitioner argued that the River Road employees were indispensable parties and plaintiffs argued to the contrary. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals (R. 291), an indispensable party is one without whom the court can do nothing. This Court has many times so held.* Nevertheless, this Court did not hold that the River Road employees were indispensable parties. To the contrary, it clearly held that the court could go on without them, stating (331 U. S. 531) that they "would be bound by any judgment that might be entered in the case," also "Whether the employees' interests should be asserted or defended in a proceeding where those interests are at stake is a question to be decided by the employees' representative, not by the court."

* *Shields v. Barrow*, 17 How. 130, 144; *Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co.*, 184 U. S. 199, 247; *Niles-Bement Co. v. Iron Moulders Union*, 254 U. S. 77, 80.

Petitioner is a party to this suit because this Court held in effect that it was dispensable, that the River Road trainmen would be bound by any judgment which would be entered in the suit, and therefore, under Section 17 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, it was entitled to intervene to protect their interests if it wished. This conclusion could hardly be plainer if this Court had spelled it out in so many words.

The only interest the River Road trainmen have in this suit is in their claimed right to do the trainmen's work in the two additional switching movements brought about by the change in operations on February 1, 1946. If the plaintiffs and the Commission should prevail on the merits, that work will not be done by the River Road trainmen or by anybody else. If the River Road should do that work, it would require more hours of labor from its trainmen, more coal, more lubricants, and more of all the variety of supplies needed in the maintenance and operation of switch engines. Any supplier who had a contract with the River Road to supply the coal, the oil, or any other of the commodities consumed in such maintenance and operation would have just as sound a basis for asserting that he is an indispensable party to this suit as the petitioner has, because the River Road would use less coal, less oil, and less of any other such supplies just as well as less labor if it did not do the work. Yet no one would attempt for a moment to sustain the claim of such supplier that he was an indispensable party.

Petitioner's claim (p. 26) that Rule 65 (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is deprived of its vitality by the holding that it is not an indispensable party is utterly groundless. The only pertinent portion of that rule is to the effect that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not modify the provisions of the Clayton or the Norris-LaGuardia Acts. The fact that those acts are not applicable to this suit disposes of petitioner's contention.

It might be noted in passing that, though this Court has permitted petitioner to intervene in this suit, its efforts to date have been devoted to preventing a hearing on the merits of the case, and the other employees have not even availed themselves of their right to intervene.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO VACATE THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

Petitioner's contention (pp. 27-30) that the Court of Appeals has limited the application of Rule 52 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure so as to destroy its purpose is wholly untenable.

The pertinent parts of Rule 52(a) now provide:

"* * * in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. * * * *Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b).*"

The italicized language was added by the amendment to the rule adopted by this Court on December 27, 1946.

Before such amendment, Rule 52(a), in so far as pertinent here, was the same as Equity Rule 70½. In *Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co.*, 83 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 1), cert. den. 298 U. S. 689, it was held that Equity Rule 70½ did not apply to a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction. Petitioner has cited no authority to the contrary.

If there were any possible doubt about the matter, the recent amendment to the rule has removed it by providing

that such findings and conclusions "are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or *any other motion* except as provided in Rule 41(b)," which latter rule is in no way pertinent here. This being true, it is, perhaps, unnecessary to point out the error in petitioner's contention that many new questions were raised by its motion to vacate the preliminary injunction and that in the absence of further findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court of Appeals could not know and review the grounds for the District Court's rulings. We have previously shown that the only two grounds assigned by petitioner for its motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction went to the jurisdiction of the court. The overruling of petitioner's motion was necessarily based upon a finding that the court had jurisdiction. The question of the District Court's jurisdiction was fully considered by the Court of Appeals.

V.

PETITIONER HAS NO CAUSE TO COMPLAIN OF THE INJUNCTION BOND.

Rule 65 (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure following 28 U. S. C. A., Section 382, provides in substance that no temporary injunction, etc., shall issue "except upon the giving of security by the applicant, *in such sum as the court deems proper*" for the payment of such damages as may be sustained by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined.

At the time of granting the preliminary injunction, the court ordered plaintiffs to file a bond for \$10,000 conditioned as required by the rule and statute (R. 67), and a bond in that amount was filed and approved by the court on the same day (R. 68-70). It was the view of the District Court that an intervener takes the case as he finds it and cannot attack prior orders of the court, but that, even in

the absence of any intervention, the court had power at any time in its discretion to require additional security of plaintiffs and so directed plaintiffs to file additional security for the benefit of the River Road trainmen in the amount of \$25,000 to become effective as of the date the motion for additional security was presented to him (R. 230-231). Even had the additional bond been given pursuant to the requirements of the rule and statute above mentioned, the amount thereof would have been very largely in the discretion of the court. *Detroit Trust Co. v. Campbell River Timber Co.*, 98 F. (2d) 389, 393 (C. C. A. 9).

Furthermore, petitioner submitted no evidence as to the amount of damages which the River Road trainmen might sustain by reason of the injunction. Attached to the motion to vacate the preliminary injunction, etc., was an affidavit (R. 146) alleging that the trainmen, engineers, firemen and enginemen "are losing work to which they are entitled and wages therefor believed to be in excess of \$200.00 per day." Not only is this statement merely on *belief* but it does not appear whose belief is involved, for it is not alleged to be the belief of the affiant. Also, since the belief applies collectively to all four classes of employees, of which the trainmen are only one, there is no way by which it can be determined what portion of the "believed" \$200.00 per day loss was believed sustained by the trainmen as distinguished from the other employees.

Again, these allegations are entirely insufficient to show that any trainmen then employed by the River Road and represented by the petitioner did sustain any loss through the enforcement of the plaintiffs' rights to operate over the River Road. The allegation is made that the employees represented by petitioner are being deprived of particular work that they are entitled to, but it is not alleged that any such employees were not then working full time and, therefore, could do the work in question if permitted to do it.

In its discretion, the District Court gave the petitioner more than it was entitled to as a matter of right and it should not be heard to complain in this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the petition of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, intervening defendant, for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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March 11, 1949.

APPENDIX.

EXCERPT FROM BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CASE OF BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, APPELLANT, *vs.* BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES; INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, INTERVENING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE; THE CHICAGO RIVER AND INDIANA RAILROAD COMPANY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES, No. 970, OCTOBER TERM, 1946 (pp. 54-62).

A.

The contention that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits the court from enforcing the order of the Commission is frivolous.

The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that no court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any injunction "in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute" except in conformity with the Act, and that no injunction shall "be issued contrary to the public policy declared" in the Act. 29 U. S. C. A. Section 101.

(1) THIS SUIT DOES NOT INVOLVE AND DID NOT GROW OUT OF A LABOR DISPUTE.

This suit grows out of the refusal of the defendants to obey the order of the Commission requiring them to continue the right of the plaintiffs to operate their cars to and from the Union Stock Yards over the line of the defendant River Road. Under the specific provisions of paragraph (12) of Section 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act the failure of the defendants to obey that order gave rise to the cause of action which plaintiffs have stated in their

complaint in this suit. Furthermore, upon proof of the breach of that order, the court is commanded to issue an injunction enforcing it. The duty to obey the order is absolute unless and until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction or is vacated or modified by the Commission itself. Neither the plaintiffs nor the court are in any way concerned with the considerations which might have influenced the defendants to commit a breach of the order. Such factors have no bearing on the plaintiffs' right to maintain this suit and are not pertinent to any issue presented by it. The suit therefore does not involve and did not grow out of a labor dispute. It involves and grows out of a violation of the Commission's order.

(2) A FUNDAMENTAL RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FORBIDS THE APPLICATION OF THE NORRIS-LA GUARDIA ACT TO THIS SUIT.

The Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U. S. C. A. Secs. 101-115) was enacted March 23, 1932. It is broad in its scope and deals with situations having an almost infinite variety of aspects and arising anywhere in the field of labor relations.

Paragraph (12) of Section 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act, under which plaintiffs brought this suit, has been twice amended and as so amended reenacted since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It was amended on April 9, 1935 (c. 498, Sec. 1, 49 Stat. 543) and again on September 18, 1940 (c. 722, Title I, Sec. 11(a), (b) 54 Stat. 912, 913). As so last amended and reenacted it provides (49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 16 (12)):

"If any carrier fails or neglects to obey any order of the commission other than for the payment of money, while the same is in effect, the Interstate Commerce Commission or any party injured thereby, or the United States, by its Attorney General, may apply to

any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of such order. If, after hearing, such court determines that the order was regularly made and duly served, and that the carrier is in disobedience of the same, such court shall enforce obedience to such order by a writ of injunction or other proper process, mandatory or otherwise, to restrain such carrier, its officers, agents, or representatives, from further disobedience of such order, or to enjoin upon it or them obedience to the same."

This section deals with a very limited field and is definite and specific in its requirements. An order of the Commission duly made and valid, as the order in this case has been decreed to be, has the force and effect of law. Paragraph (12) is definite, specific and mandatory in its direction as to how such order shall be enforced.

It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutes dealing with special and restricted subject matters are not affected by statutes of broad and general application unless they are specifically mentioned therein.

In *Virginian Ry. Co. v. Federation*, 300 U. S. 515, the court had issued an injunction which, among other things, commanded the railway company to treat with the representatives of its employees, a duty imposed upon it by Sec. 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act (45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 152, Ninth). To the objection that the Norris-LaGuardia Act had not been complied with, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, said (p. 563):

"It suffices to say that the Norris-LaGuardia Act can affect the present decree only so far as its provisions are found not to conflict with those of § 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act, authorizing the relief which has been granted. *Such provisions cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.* See the *Railway Clerks* case, *supra*, 571; (281 U. S. 548) cf. *Callahan v. United*

States, 285 U. S. 515, 518; *Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co.*, 172 U. S. 1, 22; *International Alliance v. Rex Theatre Corp.*, 73 F. (2d) 92, 93."

In fact the rule that a general statute will not affect a special statute also applies in the case where the special statute is prior in time to the general statute. Thus in 59 *Corpus Juris, Statutes*, it is said (p. 1057):

"It is a fundamental rule that where the general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment. Where the special statute is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or qualification of, the prior general one; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, *unless it is repealed in express words or by necessary implication.*"

The same rule is stated in 50 *American Jurisprudence, Statutes*, p. 564.

In *Rodgers v. United States*, 185 U. S. 83, this Court said (p. 87):

"It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. In other words, where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general—the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special—the fact that the one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, and the general will not be understood as repealing the special, unless a repeal is expressly named, or unless the provisions of the general are manifestly inconsistent with those of the special."

After quoting from decisions in a number of other cases, this Court continued (p. 88):

"In Black on Interpretation of Laws, 116, the proposition is thus stated:

" 'As a corollary from the doctrine that implied repeals are not favored, it has come to be an established rule in the construction of statutes that a subsequent act, treating a subject in general terms and not expressly contradicting the provisions of a prior special statute, is not to be considered as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.'

"So, in Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, the author observes, on page 98, with respect to this rule:

" 'The reason and philosophy of the rule is, that when the mind of the legislator has been turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute in general terms or treating the subject in a general manner and not expressly contradicting the original act, shall not be considered as intended to affect the more particular or positive previous provisions, *unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a construction, in order that its words shall have any meaning at all.*' "

The above case has been often cited and followed by this Court. See, *e. g.*, *Washington v. Miller*, 235 U. S. 422, 428; *United States v. Berkeness*, 275 U. S. 149, 155-156.

Certainly it is not absolutely necessary, in order to give the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act any effect, to so construe it as to prevent a court of the United States from enforcing by injunction an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which it is specifically commanded to do by the provisions of said paragraph (12). Yet, according to this Court, unless there is such necessity, paragraph (12) must stand as an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

- (3) **THE NORRIS-LaGUARDIA ACT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE UNITED STATES WHICH, ACTING THROUGH THE INTER-STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, IS ASKING FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S ORDER.**

In *United States v. United Mine Workers of America*, U. S., 67 S. Ct. 677, this Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not applicable to the United States, saying (p. 686):

“There is an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest preexisting rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.”

As previously pointed out, the Interstate Commerce Commission filed an intervening complaint in this suit on February 21, 1946, within nine days after the complaint of the plaintiffs was filed, in which it charged that the defendants were violating its order of May 16, 1922, and Condition 3 thereof, and in which it prayed for a preliminary and a permanent injunction “restraining and enjoining the defendants and each of them, their respective officers, agents, representatives, servants, employees and successors from (a) failing and neglecting to obey said order of the Commission of May 16, 1922,” and from “(b) violating condition 3 of said order of the Commission of May 16, 1922.” (R. 47-49.)

As previously pointed out, paragraph (12) of Section 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act specifically gives the Commission authority to apply to the appropriate District Court of the United States for the enforcement of its orders. In its complaint the Commission alleged that Section 5 (8) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 5 (8)) gives the court jurisdiction to award the relief prayed for by it (R. 49).

Section 5 (8) provides:

“The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction upon the complaint of the Commission, al-

leging a violation of any of the provisions of this section or disobedience of any order issued by the Commission thereunder by any person, to issue such writs of injunction or other proper process, mandatory or otherwise, as may be necessary to restrain such person from violation of such provision or to compel obedience to such order."

Section 5 (8) was first enacted as Section 5 (13) by the Act of June 16, 1933 (more than one year after the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act) (c. 91, Title II, Sec. 202, 48 Stat. 217-220), and was amended and renumbered as Section 5 (8) by the act of September 18, 1940 (c. 722, Title I, Sec. 7, 54 Stat. 905).

That the Commission is an arm of the United States Government to which Congress has, by the Interstate Commerce Act, delegated certain of its sovereign powers, cannot be doubted. *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U. S. 388, 426, 427; *Inter-Mountain Rate Case*, 234 U. S. 476, 486.

Nor can it be doubted that in entering the order of May 16, 1922, and in seeking its enforcement, it is exercising such delegated powers of sovereignty. *N. Y. Central Securities Co. v. U. S.*, 287 U. S. 12; *Texas v. U. S.*, 292 U. S. 522; *Thompson v. Texas Mexican R. Co.*, 328 U. S. 134.

There is obviously no legitimate reason why the Norris-LaGuardia Act should be a bar to a suit brought by the Interstate Commerce Commission to enforce its order if, as is this case, it would be no bar had the suit been brought by the Attorney General in the name of the United States. Either the Commission or the Attorney General is authorized to bring such suit under paragraph (12) of Section 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act.

Furthermore, the rules of statutory construction above discussed are peculiarly applicable to a suit brought by the Commission under Section 5 (8), first enacted after the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and being limited in

its scope to the enforcement of orders issued under Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, under which section the order here involved was entered.

Therefore, for three reasons, each of which in and of itself is sufficient in the premises, the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not applicable to the present suit. These reasons are, (1) the suit does not arise or grow out of a labor dispute; (2) even if it did, a fundamental rule of statutory construction forbids the application of the Act to this suit; (3) the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not applicable to the United States which, acting through the Commission, is asking for the enforcement of the order.

(4) THE CASES CITED BY APPELLANT DEALING WITH THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT HAVE NO APPLICATION.

In view of the foregoing considerations, only brief notice need be given to the cases cited by appellant (Br. pp. 29-31) in support of its position that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable to this suit.

The case of *Trainmen v. Tol., P. and W. R. Co.*, 321 U. S. 50, simply holds that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents a railroad from procuring an injunction restraining violence on the part of its striking employees where it has not fully complied with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act (45 U. S. C. A. Secs. 151-164). That case is in no way applicable here.

Southeastern Motor Lines v. Hoover Truck Co., 34 F. Supp. 390 (Dist. Ct., M. D. Tenn.), and *Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines*, 126 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 10), are likewise inapplicable. In both cases the plaintiffs, who were motor carriers, were engaged in labor disputes with their own employees and their places of busi-

ness were being picketed. Connecting motor carriers who customarily interchanged freight with plaintiffs had contracts with their employees which provided that they would not be required to cross picket lines. In each case the plaintiff sued to compel the connecting motor carriers to continue to interchange freight with it. Mandatory injunctions were refused because a labor dispute was involved within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In both cases there were labor disputes between the plaintiffs and their own employees which had resulted in strikes, and the employers were seeking the aid of the general equity powers of the court to break the strikes. This is precisely what the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits. None of the three above mentioned considerations making the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable to this suit obtained in either of those cases.

INDEX

	Page
Opinions below	1
Jurisdiction	1
Questions presented	2
Statute and rule involved	2
Statement	3
Argument	6
Conclusion	11
Appendix	12

CITATIONS

Cases:

<i>Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal</i> , 333 U. S. 437	8
<i>Hamilton Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers</i> , 240 U. S. 251	6
<i>Klapprott v. United States</i> , 335 U. S. 601	10
<i>Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Keystone Freight Lines</i> , 126 F. 2d 931	8
<i>Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O. R. Co.</i> , 331 U. S. 519	3, 6, 9
<i>United States v. Ballard</i> , 322 U. S. 78	7
<i>Virginian Ry. v. Federation</i> , 300 U. S. 515	7
<i>Walling v. Reuter Co.</i> , 321 U. S. 671	10

Statutes:

Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C., Section 5(2) (f)	2
Section 16(12)	9, 12

Miscellaneous:

Rule 41 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	11
Rule 52 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	10, 12
Rule 86 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	10

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1948

No. 548

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, PETITIONER

v.

THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY,
ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
INTERVENING PLAINTIFF, IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The district court rendered no opinion. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (R. 285-293) is reported in 170 F. 2d 654.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on November 11, 1948 (R. 294). The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C., 1254.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives the federal courts of their jurisdiction, conferred by the Interstate Commerce Act, to enforce an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribing the operating relationships between the plaintiff trunk line rail carriers and the defendant switching carrier when employees of the switching carrier object to such enforcement.

2. Whether, in such an action, the employees of the defendant switching carrier are indispensable parties.

3. Whether denial of a motion to vacate a preliminary injunction must be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law.

4. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in fixing the terms for an injunction bond.

5. Whether issuance of the preliminary injunction in this case was precluded by Section 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the terms of the Commission's order, or the public interest.

STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED

Section 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act and Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are set forth in the Appendix, *infra*, pp. 12-13.

STATEMENT

This case came before this Court during its 1946 Term. *Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O. R. Co.*, 331 U.S. 519. The situation giving rise to the problem there presented as well as the issues involved at this stage of the litigation is described in some detail in this Court's opinion in that case. For present purposes it is sufficient to summarize the facts there stated before setting out the proceedings which followed upon this Court's judgment in that case.

In 1922, the Interstate Commerce Commission approved transactions whereby the New York Central Railroad Co. (Central) secured ownership and control of trackage and switching facilities at the Union Stock Yards in Chicago, the facilities of the Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co. (River Road) being those with which we are here concerned.

A condition on the Commission's approval was that "The present traffic and operating relationships existing between the Junction [another switching carrier] and River Road and all carriers operating in Chicago shall be continued, in so far as such matters are within the control of the Central."

Before and after the Commission's order, the trunk line railroads used their own power and crews in moving their livestock cars over the trackage operated by River Road but, on and after February 1, 1946, River Road power and crews were used. This change resulted from a settlement

between the River Road and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, petitioner in this case, which represented the River Road's trainmen and which had threatened a strike unless the work in question was given to the River Road trainmen.¹

The trunk line railroads then brought suit for a preliminary and permanent injunction under Section 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act, claiming that the new practice was in violation of the condition of the Commission's order quoted above. They sought to enjoin the defendant switching railroads and "their respective officers, agents, representatives, servants, employees and successors" from disobeying the Commission order.

The Commission intervened as a party plaintiff and the district court issued a preliminary injunction as requested. Three days after the preliminary injunction became effective, the Brotherhood, petitioner here, asked leave to file its special appearance in order that it might move to vacate the injunction and dismiss the proceedings for failure to join the Brotherhood and its members as indispensable parties.

Upon denial of this motion, River Road filed its answer, and the Brotherhood moved to intervene as a party defendant, on the ground that it and its members were indispensable parties. The district court having denied the motion to intervene, a direct appeal was taken to this Court which resulted

¹ Under the agreement, the River Road men did the work on the outbound movements; inbound movements were to continue to be handled by foreign line crews (R. 85, 145).

in a reversal on the ground that the Brotherhood had an absolute right to intervene.

On remand, after the decision of this Court, the Brotherhood was permitted to intervene (R. 138), and it then filed a motion to vacate the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the injunction was issued when none of the River Road's employees were parties, that the employees were indispensable parties, and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded injunctive relief in the circumstances of the case (R. 139-141). The Brotherhood also sought an award of damages arising out of the allegedly improvident issuance of the injunction, and summary judgment on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction because the River Road's engineers, firemen, and enginemen, being indispensable parties, had not been joined, and, in the alternative, that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (R. 141-142).

The Brotherhood, three days later, then filed a motion for an order requiring the plaintiffs to give additional security, in which it asked that the previously filed bond for \$10,000 be increased to \$100,000, and pointed out its doubts as to whether the previous bond inured to the benefit of all employees of the River Road (R. 158-160).

After the trial judge had stated his views with respect to these motions of the Brotherhood (R. 230-233), and after an order was entered continuing the cause "for the entry of supplemental find-

ings of fact and conclusions of law" (R. 260), an order was drawn by the parties and signed by the judge (R. 259-261). The order denied the Brotherhood's motion to vacate the preliminary injunction, to assess damages and for summary judgment, and directed the plaintiffs to file a bond in the amount of \$25,000 "conditioned on the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered on and after the 13th day of October, 1947, by the trainmen employed by the [River Road], who may be found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained by said preliminary injunction" (R. 260-261).

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this order of the district court (R. 285-294).

ARGUMENT

The petitioner's application for a writ of certiorari constitutes an attempt by it to secure review by this Court of an interlocutory order. This fact has a twofold significance. In the first place, it is settled that "except in extraordinary cases, the writ is not issued until final decree." *Hamilton Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers*, 240 U. S. 251, 258, and cases cited. Unlike the situation presented when this case was last brought to this Court (*Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O. R. Co.*, 331 U. S. 519), there are not now present any questions the correct disposition of which is both basic to the further conduct of this case and of such extraordinary importance as to justify the piecemeal review now

sought. In the second place, the interlocutory nature of the order of the district court led the court of appeals, in the proper exercise of its discretion, to refuse to pass on the substantive questions briefly described in the fifth question presented. *Supra*, p. 2. It follows *a fortiori* that this Court should not decide questions which were properly left undecided below. Cf. *United States v. Ballard*, 322 U. S. 78, 88. And, that being so, this brief will be confined to a discussion of those issues which were decided by the Court of Appeals.²

1. Even if this case more clearly and directly involved a "labor dispute" than it does, it would seem to be governed by this Court's decision in *Virginian Ry. v. Federation*, 300 U. S. 515, 563, rejecting a similar argument as to the enforcement of the Railway Labor Act, although that Act contained no express authorization such as is found in Section 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act. It follows that Section 16(12), which expressly authorizes suits to enforce Commission orders and which has been reenacted since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (R. 290), "cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 300 U. S. at 563. While the *Virginian* case arose

² The question raised by the petitioner as to the adequacy of the injunction bond is of no direct concern to the Interstate Commerce Commission and is, for that reason, not discussed in this brief. The Government does wish to point out, however, that that is hardly a question of general importance requiring the intervention of this Court through a writ of certiorari.

directly out of, and had an immediate and necessary effect on, a dispute between employers and employees, there is, in this case, no labor dispute between the respondent railroads and the Brotherhood, they do not stand in the relationship of employer and employee, and the dispute between the Brotherhood and the River Road was settled amicably in February, 1946. The situation in this case is strikingly like that involved in *Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal*, 333 U. S. 437, 443, in which this Court said:

To hold that under such circumstances a failure of two business men to come to terms created a labor dispute merely because what one of them sought might have affected the work of a particular employee of the other, would be to turn almost every controversy between sellers and buyers over price, quantity, quality, delivery, payment, credit, or any other business transaction into a "labor dispute." * * * Furthermore, on the basis of what we have before us, respondent's disagreement * * * was a dead controversy, not involved in the subsequent dispute * * *.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in *Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Keystone Freight Lines*, 126 F. 2d 931, is not in conflict with that of the court below. In that case, as the court below noted (R. 289), "the plaintiff, the employer, was seeking the aid of the general equity powers of the court to break the strike." Here, the plaintiffs had no dispute with their em-

ployees, and the relief sought was that expressly authorized by Section 16(12); the general equity powers of the court were not being invoked.

2. As appears from the Statement, *supra*, p. 4, the Brotherhood's first request of the district court was that it dismiss the proceedings for lack of indispensable parties. When that request was denied, the Brotherhood sought leave to intervene on the ground that it was an indispensable party. This Court, in *Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O. R. Co.*, 331 U. S. 519, upheld the right of the Brotherhood to intervene, and it would seem that the Brotherhood would now be precluded from reverting to its initial claim, from the denial of which it took no appeal, that the proceedings must be dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party.

Moreover, the Brotherhood's present claim that all of the River Road's employees are indispensable parties appears to be inconsistent with this Court's opinion in the *Railroad Trainmen* case (331 U. S. at 531), in which it was stated that "Whether the employee's interests should be asserted or defended in a proceeding where those interests are at stake is a question to be decided by the employees' representative, not by the court." Certainly, if the employees were indispensable parties, they would have no option as to their participation in the proceeding; but this Court has made it clear that the option was theirs.

As the court below noted (R. 292), Section 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act authorizes

the district court "to enforce obedience to the order of the Commission by injunction 'to restrain such carrier, its officers, agents, or representatives, from disobedience of such order, or to enjoin upon it or them obedience to the same.'" Since "an injunction may issue against and be binding upon the employees of a party without the employees being made parties to the suit [cf. *Walling v. Reuter Co.*, 321 U. S. 671, 675], it is clear that the principle (sic) of indispensable party cannot be invoked in this case."

3. The petitioner alleges in this Court (Pet. 27-30), as it did in the court below, that the district court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying the motion to vacate the preliminary injunction and for other relief.³ But the amendment to Rule 52(a) which took effect less than a month after the order of the district court was entered and which may well be applicable, under Rule 86 (b), to this proceeding,⁴ provides that, "Findings of fact and con-

³ There is some question as to petitioner's right to object to the failure to enter findings and conclusions. The record shows that the trial judge intended to make findings and conclusions in a form submitted to him by the parties, which would supplement those he had formerly made (R. 253, 59-68), and the last action of the trial judge with respect to findings and conclusions was an order for a continuance "for the entry of supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law" (R. 260). But the parties having agreed on the form of order to be entered (R. 259), the judge proceeded to sign it, no objection being made by the petitioner to the absence of findings and conclusions (R. 260-261).

⁴ *Klapprott v. United States*, 335 U. S. 601, 608-609.

clusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b).” Since this motion was not under Rule 41 (b), it is clear, under the revised Rules, that findings and conclusions were not necessary on the petitioner’s motion to vacate the preliminary injunction and for summary judgment. In any event, the new Rule settles the question for the future, and the proper interpretation of the former Rule (if applicable) certainly does not present an issue of sufficient importance to warrant review by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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MARCH, 1949.

APPENDIX

Section 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 16(12)) provides as follows:

If any carrier fails or neglects to obey any order of the Commission other than for the payment of money, while the same is in effect, the Interstate Commerce Commission or any party injured thereby, or the United States, by its Attorney General, may apply to any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of such order. If, after hearing, such court determines that the order was regularly made and duly served, and that the carrier is in disobedience of the same, such court shall enforce obedience to such order by a writ of injunction or other proper process, mandatory or otherwise, to restrain such carrier, its officers, agents, or representatives, from further disobedience of such order, or to enjoin upon it or them obedience to the same.

Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment; and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Request for findings are not necessary for purposes of

review. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b).